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We study the class of principal-informer-agent problems that includes decision making 
problems under uncertainty, principal-agent problems with hidden information principal-
supervisor-agent problems, and many others. We introduce the concept of verifiability 
structure which plays an important role in determining the "informativeness" of an informer. 
With the help of the concept of verifiability structure, we derive some preliminary insights on 
the "informativeness" of informers. We also apply our findings to the Chinese central 
government's problem of signing responsibility contracts with its state enterprises and show 
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n - probability that the mid-tier governmental unit observes co! 
s -- state of nature 
u von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function of the decision maker 
y — output level of an enterprise 
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y — choice mechanism 
— weights of the enterprise's and the mid-tier governmental unit's payoffs, respectively, 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the economic literature of decision making under uncertainty, we investigate how a 
decision maker chooses the optimal action to maximize his expected utility when he does not 
know the state of nature. One of the most fundamental insights in the literature is that the 
decision maker will be (weakly) better off if he can costlessly observe a signal of the state of 
nature (Laffont 1989; 56-66). The intuition is that the decision maker can always ignore the 
signal and achieve at least what he can achieve when there is no signal at all. Another much 
more important insight in the literature is that if a signal is sufficient^ in statistical sense for 
another signal, then the former signal is more informative in economic sense than the latter 
one in all decision making problems. This powerful statement is called the Blackwell theorem 
(Blackwell, 1951). The Blackwell theorem fills the gap between the statistical concept of 
sufficiency and the economic concept of informativeness, and hence provides a partial 
ordering for signals which has economic importance. 
However, the practical usefulness of the Blackwell theorem is limited. The Blackwell 
theorem compares the informativeness of costlessly observed signals. But in most of the 
economic settings, signals are not costlessly observed. In particular, in a large number of 
economic situations, the decision maker does not observe the signal by himself directly, but 
rather buys the signal from a third party instead. Mechandizers buy quality-check reports of 
certain commodities, employers request recommendation letters from job-seekers, prospective 
investors read financial statements of corporations that are going to issue new s tocks . . . etc. 
These are but a few examples of decision makers obtaining signals about the state of nature 
from some third parties The very difference between observing a signal oneself and buying a 
signal from a third party is that while one cannot cheat himself, the third party can cheat the 
decision maker. So decision makers seldom treat the signals they obtain in the way the 
Blackwell theorem implicitly pre-supposes. The Blackwell theorem is applicable only when 
2 To be defined in chapter one. 
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the third party concerned is honest, or just for whatever reason cannot cheat, which is surely a 
very restrictive, if not too unrealistic, case. 
This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap. We argue that when the signals are provided 
by some third parties called informers, the decision makers' choice over signals is in essence a 
choice over informers. We will develop another informativeness concept, the v-
informativeness, to compare informers, in contrast to that of Blackwell (which we would like 
to call it the Q-informativeness) which is used to compare signals. The problem solved by 
Blackwell can therefore be viewed as a subset of our more general problem in which the third 
party concerned will not cheat. Though we have not succeeded in advancing necessary and 
sufficient conditions for v-informativeness of informers in the most general case, we do have 
derived some sufficient (and sometimes necessary) conditions in some restricted cases. 
To demonstrate how distinguishing the two concepts of informativeness can improve 
our understanding of real life economic phenomenon, we will also investigate into the Chinese 
central government's problem of signing responsibility contracts with its state enterprises. The 
Chinese central government's problem can be read as a problem of choosing informers because 
the Chinese central government has to rely on its informers -- the local governments - to 
determine the terms of contracts. We show by a very simple model how considering the Q-
informativeness only may misguide the central government. 
While this thesis can be viewed as a supplement of the Blackwell theorem, it can also 
be viewed as a contribution to the literature of information cost. 
The emphasis on the cost of information put by economists seems to seek its historic 
roots from at least two sourses. The first source is the debate on the relative superiority of 
market economy versus central planning. It was argued intuitively by advocates of market 
economy that the price system employed by the market is more informationally superior in the 
sense that it economizes the cost of information gathering and subsequent computation. 
However, before this intuition can be formalized and verified, there remain numerous gaps to 
be filled (Marschak, 1987). In particular, as market equilibrium is approached only iteratively 
under the price system, a market economy may not be able to economize the cost of 
information transmission though it may really economize the cost of information gathering. 
5 
I, •••"IIimi•IIHIMMI IHtliI|_IhHIMP IliJli^  • 'II 
Therefore we at least need an explicit measure of the costs of information gathering and 
transmission if we are to aggregate these two costs in order to verify the intuition of the 
market economy advocates. This idea had been explicitly voiced by Arrow (1974), "... what 
was left obscure is a more definite measure of information and its costs, in terms of which it 
would be possible to assert the superiority of the price system over a centralized alternative... 
if we are going to take informational economy seriously, we have to add to our usual 
economic calculations an appropriate measure of the costs of information gathering and 
transmission." (p.5) 
The second root of the literature of information cost is the team theory. Briefly 
speaking, the problem of a team is to determine which team member is to collect what 
information (or observe what signals), and to communicate with which other fellow members, 
and to make decisions according to what decision rule, in order to maximize some collective 
objective functions of the whole team. Again, an explicit measure of the costs of information 
gathering and transmission is crucial to this analysis, because the absence of information cost 
will unrealistically imply that all team members should collect as much information as possible. 
In fact, due to the immaturity of the literature of information cost, "most of the theory of 
teams to date has concentrated on choosing optimal decision structures[, that is, the choice of 
decision rules,] for a given information structure[ that is, the assignment of signals to team 
members], rather than optimizing on information structures, thereby avoiding explicit 
consideration of cost functions." (Arrow, 1985:304) j 
It turns out that the derivation of a direct measurement of the costs of information is 
extraordinarily difficult. Most of the papers in the literature heavily borrow the existing 
information theory to construct their functions of information cost, either that of gathering or 
transmission. According to the information theory, if the set of possible states of nature and 
the probability distribution of the states of nature are known, then the minimum expected 
number of letters needed to encode the true state of nature can be calculated. Let 
r -
S {s^  s2 ...} denote the countably infinite set of possible states of nature, P {ppP”…} 
denote the corresponding probability distribution of the states of nature and 
A {ai a2 . . . ak} denote the finite collection of alphabet used to encode the true state of 
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nature. Then the minimum expected number of letters needed to encode the true state of 
nature can be approximated by the entropy H(P) of P, where: 
This result can be directly borrowed to construct a measure of the cost of information 
gathering. Suppose one has the following procedure for identifying the true state of nature. 
He first divided the set of possible states of nature in any desired way into k parts, and it is 
possible to identify in which part the true state of nature lies. He can then divided the 
remaining subset of states of nature into k parts, and repeat the above procedure again and 
again, until the true state of nature is singled out. According to the information theory, the 
minimum expected number of times the above procedure has to be repeated in order to single 
out the true state of nature can be approximated by H(P). If the cost of information 
gathering is proportional to the number of times the above procedure is to be repeated, then 
H(P) can be used as a proxy of the cost of information gathering. Arrow (1985) suggests 
one such measure of cost of information gathering with k 2 • 
Similar way is employed to construct a measure of the cost of information 
transmission. Suppose the information about the true state of nature is to be transmitted with 
a language with k available different letters. Then the information theory suggests that the 
minimum expected number of letters to encode the information can be approximated by H(P). 
If the cost of information transmission is proportional to the number of letters to be 
transmitted, the minimum expected cost of transmitting a pi^ce of information will then be a 
function o f H ( P ) . Oniki (1986) applies one so constructed cost function to argue that market 
economy incurs a lower cost of information transmission than central planning. 
Yet not all models model the cost of information transmission by capturing the direct 
costs (time and resources) incurred. Sah and Stiglitz (1986) argue that there are also indirect 
costs which "result from the inevitable contamination that occurs in the process of information 
communication." (p.717) Sah and Stiglitz (1986) investigate the implication of these indirect 
costs for the choice of the architecture of an economic system or organization. In particular, 
they argue that if the objective of an organization is to pick good projects from a pool of good 
and bad projects, a polyarchical form of architecture will admit more good projects as well as 
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bad ones, while a hierarchical form of architecture will do the opposite. So the relative cost of 
rejecting too many good projects as compared to that of admitting too many bad projects will 
determine the optimal architecture of the organization. 
. . W h i l e Sah and Stiglitz (1986) model the indirect costs of information transmission as 
^ogeaous iy <ireeTi 'and LafFont (1986) go a step further to endogenize even these 
costs, l l ie information theory h again called into service in the due course. Suppose the 
information about the true state of nature has to be transmitted R times every unit time, and 
the transmission technology only allows R, letters to be transmitted every unit time. 
Information transmission incurs direct costs in the sense that the installation of the 
transmission technology is costly, and the installation cost is higher for larger R,. According 
to the information theory, the minimum R, that guarantees perfect transmission can be 
approximated by RoH(P). If R, < RoH(P), some different states of nature may have to be 
encoded into the same string of letters during the transmission, and some errors will therefore 
arise in the process of transmission. So the choice of transmission technology involves the 
trading off of the installation cost against the indirect costs arising from transmission errors. 
One of common features of the above models is that costs of information are always 
related to the amount of information -- it is exactly the information theory which provides a 
measure for the amount of information is called into service in almost all the above models. 
Our work in this thesis represents a completely different approach to the information cost 
problem. In our model, a decision maker will incur a cost when he collects information 
because additional constraints will be imposed to his set of feasible actions. This deters the 
decision maker from collecting as much information as possible. 
- T h e structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter one develops the theoretical 
framework used to compare informers, and derives some preliminary insights on the v-
informativeness of informers. Chapter two investigates into the Chinese central government's 
problem of signing responsibility contracts. Though chapter one and chapter two are related 
in the sense that chapter two exhibits a working example for some results in chapter one the 
two chapters can nevertheless be read independently without loosing continuity. 
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CHAPTER ONE: ON V-INFORMATIVENESS OF INFORMERS 
Section one: Introduction 
Consider a decision maker with a von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function u(a,0j) 
defined over A x 0 , where A is the set of possible actions and 0 is the set of possible (payoff-
relevant) states of nature, ( h , .Assume that the decision maker cannot observe the 
state of nature. So the problem of an expected-utility-maximizing decision maker is: 
max Z 7 i ( e ) u ( a ei), 
asA e 
where 71 (0 ) is the probability that the state of nature 0 has realized. = 
7i(e >0, ve. G0.) 
Suppose now the decision maker can costlessly observe a signal before acting. Denote 
the signal by Q, which is in fact a set of possible values observed by the decision maker, 
(CO”®2 . . J). The decision maker can then improve his choice of action by making his 
choice contingent on the value of the signal he happens to observe. Formally, the problem of 
the decision maker becomes: 
maxy7i(e.)y7i(coj |e,)u(a(co^),0j , 
• J ) 6., CO, 
where 7i(a)^|e.) is the probability that value cOj will be observed conditional on that 9. has 
realized. 
Since the decision maker can always choose a(co =a* , where a* is the solution to 
1 
the decision-making-without-signal problem, the decision maker can never be worse off with 
signal a . This is one of the fundamental insights in the literature of decision making under 
uncertainty. , •• 
Suppose now the decision maker can choose between two signals. Can we tell which 
one should he choose? Since a signal will have different values for different decision makers, 
and a signal that is valuable for some decision makers may have little value to other decision 
makers, it is therefore impossible to introduce a total ordering for the signals according to 
their values to decision makers. Nevertheless, Blackwell suggests that there does exist a 
partial ordering of signals that can be economically meaningful. The now well known 
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Blackwell theorem states that the partial ordering of signals based on the statistical concept of 
sufficiency is equivalent to an economic partial ordering of signals based on the values of the 
signals to the decision makers. 
Let p ( Q ; A , u ) denote the maximized expected utility of the decision maker with 
utility function u and action set A when he makes use of the signal Q. Qj is said to be more 
informative than if p ( Q , ; A , u ) has values higher than or equal to that of A u) for 
all decision makers. In the subsequent discussion another concept of "informativeness" will be 
defined which is called v-informativeness. To clearly distinguish the "informativeness" used 
• - . „ - - . . . 
here from the one to be defined subsequently, we will called the one used here as Q-
informativeness. It is sufficient by now to remember that Q-informativeness is a partial 
ordering of signals (while v-informativeness is a partial ordering of informers). 
Formally we have: 
Definition Q, is more Q-iiiformative than if p (Q, ;A,u) > ( f l ” A,u) for all A 
and u. 
Statistically, we say that Q, is sufficient for Q^ if is generated simply by "adding 
noise" to . Let L(Q) denote the likelihood matrix of signal Q, that is: 
L( (71(00 
where i is the column number and j is the row number. Then we have: 
Definition Q, is sufficient for Q, if there exists a Markov matrix,^ M, such that: 
L(Q, ) = L(Q,)M. 
To see how this definition conveys the idea of "adding noise," we can interpret the 
component of in the p-th row and q-th column of M as (cSq|cOp) where co^  is the p-th value 
of l^i and (Sq is the q-rh value of Q, . If M exists, the conditional probabilities, 7c((3 JcOp)'s, 
will then be constants independent of the state of nature. So signal Q, can be interpreted as 
signal Q, adding a "noise" independent of the state of nature. 
The Blackwell theorem then states that the economic partial ordering and the statistical 
partial ordering of signals are in fact equivalent. 
3 A matrix M is a MaVkov matrix i f M > 0 and Me= e, where e is a column vector 
each component of which is 1. 
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Blackwell Theorem^ Q, is more Q-informative than if and only if Q, is sufficient 
for 
Following Blackwell's spirit, Arrow (1992) goes a step further to develope the 
informational equivalence of signals. The definition of informational equivalence comes 
naturally from Blackwell's Q-informativeness: 
Definition Q, is wformatiouaUy equivalent to Q.^ if is more Q-informative than 
and Q2 is more ^-informative than Q,. 
Arrow (1992) argues that two signals are informationally equivalent if and only if one 
of the following two cases holds. The first is the signals differ from each other only in the 
names assigned to the signal realizations. The second is that if both signals abandon all their 
redundant realizations (for example, those realizations that will never realize), they then differ 
from each other only in the names assigned to the signal realizations. While the //part of this 
result is obvious, the only ,/part is both strong and non-trivial. Arrow's (1992) result can be 
formally summarized by the following two definitions and two theorems: 
Definition A matrix is irredimdent if no columns are zero and no two columns are 
collinear. 
Definition A signal, S, is s-mimmal if and only ifL(S) is irredundant. 
Theorem 2.1 For any signal, S, there exist a s-minimal signal, S such that S is 
informationally equivalent to S'. 
Theorem 2.2 Two s-minimal signals are information y equivalent if and only if they 
are the same apart from a relabeling of the signal realizations. 
Suppose now the decision maker cannot observe the signals directly, but has to rely on 
some informers to inform him about the realized values of the signals instead. Can we tell 
which signal should he choose now? Is the Blackwell theorem still useful in this situation? 
The answer to the last question st be negative, because it is apparent that 
comparing the signals alone must be far from enough now. Even when two informers can 
observe the same signal, they may have very different ability to verify their reports to the 
4 For a simple proof see Cremer (1982). 
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decision maker and hence may have very different degree of "credibility." Therefore, rather 
than choosing a more Q-informative signal, the decision maker instead chooses a more 
"informative" informer, with the signal being one of the characteristics of the informer. To 
emphasize the difference between the "informativeness" of a signal and that of an informer. 
We use the term v-informativeness when we are referring to informers 
Our task in this chapter is to derive some preliminary insights on comparing the v-
informativeness of informers. Section two will introduce the concept of verifiability structure 
which will be the corner-stone of our comparison. Section three introduce the formal 
structure of the class of principal-informer-agent problems which includes most of the 
economic settings in which the signals the decision makers consult is provided by some 
informers. Section four presents two theorems on the v-informativeness of informers in the 
framework of principal-informer-agent problems. 
Section two: Verifiability structure 
Consider two extreme types of informers. The first type of informers can verify all 
possible reports they make to the decision makers. For example, suppose the weather of a 
distant city is of concern to the decision maker. If an informer can obtain the weather reports 
of the observatory there, then he not only can provide the decision maker with a valuable 
signal of the weather there, but can readily verify whatever he says by simply showing the 
decision maker the weather reports he obtains as well. In thi? case, employing the informer is 
no different from directly observing the signal, because the decision maker does not need to 
worry that the informer will cheat for whatever reason. Whenever the informer makes a 
report, the decision maker can at the same time ask for verification, and only accept the report 
if the informer can verify it. Since the decision maker knows that the informer can verify all 
reports provided that the report is true, he can therefore deduce that the informer must be 
lying if the informer fails to verify his report. Knowing this logic, the informer will not dare to 
lie. The decision maker's choice over informers hence becomes trivial. By the Blackwell 
theorem, the decision maker should never choose informers whose signals are less Q-
informative than the others'. 
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Then consider another extreme case. The second type of informers can verify none of 
the values of the signals they observe to the decision makers. For example the weather 
observer may not be able to verify what he claims he has observed simply because he is not 
observing with the help of any weather report. In this case the decision maker can never know 
whether the informer he employs is telling the truth or just cheating. Even if the informer has 
no incentive to cheat, he does not have any incentive to tell the truth either. So the decision 
maker's best strategy in such situation is to ignore any report made by the informer and act as 
if there is no informer at all. Here the decision maker's choice over informers is trivial again. 
The Blackwell theorem is totally useless. No matter how Q-informative the signal observed 
by an informer is, the decision maker should never employ him. 
Yet there are numerous cases in between the two extreme cases above. Most of the 
economic settings are characterized by a situation in which the informers can prove only some 
of the values of the signals they observe and not the others. Take the above weather-informer 
as an example again. Suppose the observatory he relies on will collapse and all scientists 
inside will die if there is an earthquake at the city. Then the claim of the weather-informer that 
an earthquake has occurred becomes non-verifiable. When the informer claims that there has 
been an earthquake, the decision maker simply do not know whether the informer is hiding the 
weather reports and lies, or there is really an earthquake. 
The fact that some informers cannot prove all of their possible claims can greatly 
complicate the decision maker's choice over informers because two informers may have very 
different values to a decision maker even when the signals they observe are the same, provided 
that they have different subsets of values of their commonly-observed signal non-verifiable. 
Forexample, a weather-informer who cannot verify a claim of earthquake may have very 
different value to a decision maker from one who cannot verify a claim of shower. We can say 
that these two informers are different not in the signals they observe, but in the verifiahility 
structures of their signals. 
Therefore, in addition to the signal’ the verifiability structure is another major 
characteristic of an informer that a decision maker should consider in his choice over 
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informers. The first step to compare the v-informativeness of informers is hence to formalize 
the above idea of verifiability structure. 
To formalize the concept of verifiability structure, we have to first formalize that of 
"being able to verify." It seems natural to define "to verify" as the presentation of evidence(s) 
which can prove that a certain event has happened, and to define the verifiability structure of a 
signal as a partition of the set of all possible values of that signal into two subsets, one for all 
verifiable values and the other for the non-verifiable ones. However, while this may seem 
enough to describe all possible verifiability structures of a weather-informer in the above 
example, it may be far from adequate in many other cases. In particular, it may happen that 
some values of a signal are neither perfectly verifiable nor totally non-verifiable. 
For example, the number of unpublished creative papers an Ph.D. student has written 
may well be a signal of how productive he is. Being an informer of any may-be-employer of 
that student, the student's supervisor can partially verify his claim that the student has written 
a certain number of papers by showing exactly that number of papers authored by that student. 
However, the verification is by no means perfect, because the supervisor cannot prove that the 
number of papers written is no more than that he claims; or in other words, he can never prove 
that he has not hidden any paper of his student. In this case, the report of no paper is more 
"non-verifiable" than that of one paper, which is in turn more "non-verifiable" than that of two 
papers..., etc. 
To capture this idea of "relative verifiability," we suggest the following definition of 
"verifiable." We says that an informer can verify a particular value of a signal if for every 
other values (he claims to have) not realized, he can advance evidences to prove that it has 
realTy not realized.5,6 The corresponding definition of verifiability structure is therefore a class 
of subsets of a certain signal. 
5 I am indebted to Wing-Chung Pun for suggesting this verify-by-piecewise-denying 
definition, which eliminate a fatal defect of my eariler version. 
6 It is certainly not the only possible technology of verification. In fact we can easily 
raise a lot more different technologies of verification, each of which has interesting features 
not yet captured by our discussion. We use this definition only because it is a good starting 
polnffo^tEis study in the sense that it allows for imperfect verifiability and yet will not add too 
much complication to our subsequent discussion. 
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How the definitions suggested above can capture the idea of "relative verifiability" can 
best be illustrated with the help of figures 1 to 4. For a four-value signal, that is, 
Q = (co 1,0)2,CO3,0)4], the following four figures represent four of the many possible 
verifiability structures. In the figures, each black spot represents one value of the signals, © . 
Each circle therefore encloses a verifiable subset of values. The whole family of circles thus 
makes up a verifiability structure, for example, in figure 3, the verifiability structure consists of 
the following elements: {co,}, {©2,0)3}, {co: 3, 4}, and Q. The interpretation of any 
encircled subset is that the informer concerned is able to advance separate evidences to prove 
that each of the values outside the encircled subset has not realized, provided that the 
observed value (the value that has actually realized) is in the encircled subset. 
Figure 1 illustrates one of the most trivial verifiability structures. Here none of the 
values is to any extent verifiable. As we have discussed before, informer with such a 
verifiability structure is of no value to any decision maker. 
Figure 2 represents another trivial case that all values are perfectly verifiable. It 
resembles the first extreme type of informers discussed above. Yet figure 2 is far from a full 
exposition of the verifiability structure concerned. Consider a case in which the informer 
observes value c o S u r e l y he cannot pretend that he has observed value co as there is a circle 
enclosing spot co indicating that any one who really observes value co! can readily prove it. 
Similarly the informer cannot pretend that he has observed value CO3. These jointly mean that 
the informer cannot pretend that he has observed "values p , or CO3 " and therefore there 
should be a circle enclosing at least spots and CO3 but excluding spot co .^ In fact in a 
I 
complete set-diagi^ammatic exposition of verifiability stmcture, union of any two encircled 
subsets should also be circled. So figure 1 is a complete exposition while figure 2 is not. 
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Figure 3 represents a situation very much resembles the example of the Ph.D. student. 
Here value co^  is perfectly verifiable, but not values co,, CO3 and co .^ For example, when the 
informer observes value CO3, he can advance evidence that he has not observed values cOp and 
evidence that he has not observed value co„ but not that he has not observed value o)^. In 
other words, when he claims that he has observed value ©3, we do not know whether he has 
actually observed value co: but pretend that he has observed value co 3 instead. 
Note that though there is a circle enclosing values co.^ , CO3 and CO4, there is no circle 
enclosing value co,. Actually do not require that the complement of a verifiable subset is 
also verifiable. This is especially clear in the weather-informer example: Though the 
weather-informer can verify "no earthquake," he cannot verify its complement, that is "there is 
earthquake." 
Figure 4 exemplifies another more complicated situation. At first sight it seems that an 
informer observing value co3 can pretend that he has observed value co,. But it is not the case. 
In fact’ an observer who has really observed value co, can readily prove it by first proving that 
has observed "values co or co, ' and then proving that he has observed "values co: or CD3." 
In other words, figure 4 is also incomplete in the sense that there should at least be one more 
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circle enclosing spot co 2. As a rule, in a complete set-diagi-ammatic exposition of verifiability 
structure, intersection of any two encircled subsets should also be circled. 
We can now summarize our discussion on verifiability structure in the following formal 
definition. 
Definition A verifiability structure, V(Q), of a signal f i is a family of subsets of 
such that: 
(1) (t),QGV(Q);and 
q ) V,nV^&_V(Q), and u V^  G V(Q) 
Note that (2) restates that intersection and union of any two verifiable subsets are also 
verifiable. (1) is here just for completeness; the role of (1) is to guarantee that V is closed 
under intersection and union. 
Section three: Principal-informer-agent problem 
In this section we will formally introduce the family of principal-informer-agent 
problems. This will become the framework for our comparison of informers. The family of 
problems introduced here differs from that introduced in section one in two ways. The first is 
of course that we have to formally introduce an informer who is to report the signal to the 
principal into our problems. The second is that we introduce an agent who will be affected by 
the action of the principal, and hence may want to bribe the informer to mis-report the signal. 
An informer is characterized by two things. The first is the signal he observes; 
informers observing different signals are undoubtedly different in the eyes of the decision 
makers. The second is the verifiability structure of the signal the informer observes; difference 
in verifiability structures makes informers differ from each other even though they may 
observe the same signal. 
Yet if the informer has no conflict of interest with the decision maker, the informer has 
no incentive to cheat the decision maker. The reason why we do care about whether the 
informer will cheat is that sometimes the interest of the decision maker and the informer may 
not coincide. We can of course introduce an utility function to the informer so as to make the 
informer care about the decision maker's action. But this adds unnecessary complexity to the 
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comparison of informers, as we will have to regard informers with different utility functions as 
different, though they may observe the same signal and have the same verifiability structure. 
Therefore we choose to introduce an agent affected by the decision maker's action to the 
problems instead. When the agent is adversely affected by the decision maker's action, he may 
contemplate bribing the informer so that the informer will lie and misguide the decision 
maker's action in favor of the agent. If the informer maximizes the bribery he receives he will 
then cheat the decision maker. This captures the essence of many real life economic settings 
in-which- decision-makers-hesitate to4)elieve-what -the informers say with the worry- that—the 
informers may report in some other parties' interest. To model the way possible collusion 
between the informer and the agent affects the principal, we follow the pioneering work of 
Tirole(1986). 
This way of modeling also has the advantage that the family of problems can then 
include many popular problems in the economic literature as special cases; examples of them 
include decision making problems under uncertainty (that family of problems on which 
Blackwell derives his theorem), the principal-agent problems with hidden information, and 
Tirole's (1986) principal-supervisor-agent problem. We will first introduce the formal 
structure of the family of principal-informer-agent problems, and then show by some examples 
how it includes the above mentioned problems as special cases. 
Let S denote the set of possible states of nature, with s as its typical element. We 
assume that S is finite. %{.) is the probability distribution fiinction defined over 1 ” with 
.^7i:(s) 1 and 7i:(s) > 0 for all s e S . 
seS 
Definition K payoff-relevant state of nature, (Jenoted by is a partition set of S. 
Denote by 0 the set of all payoff-relevant states of nature, that is 0 = { e j . 
Consider a principal who is to choose an action, a, from the set of possible actions, A. 
Having taken action a, the principal can receive a monetary payoff amounts to P(a,e,). We 
say that the vector (A,P) fully describes a principal. 
7 denotes the power set of S, that is, : {X X q S}. 
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Definition A principal is a vector (A,P), where P is a payoff function mapping from 
the action set and the set of payoff-relevant states of nature to the real line: P: A x 0 — . 
We assume that the principal is risk-neutral and maximizes his expected net payoff (his 
monetary payoff net of any possible payment). We also assume that the principal cannot 
observe the state of nature before he chooses the action. So his problem is to: 
maxy7i (e , )P(a ,0O. 
An agent is one who is affected by the action taken by the principal and knows the 
(payoff-relevant) state of nature.^ We assume that an agent cannot verify any report about the — 
(payoff-relevant) state of nature to the principal, so that he can never become an informer 
which is to be defined below. Given action a and state of nature 9 , the agent will have a 
monetary payoff amounts to R(a,0i). We say that the function R fully describes an agent. 
Definition An agent is a payoff function, denoted by R, mapping from the set of 
payoff-relevant states of nature and the action set to the real line: R : 0 x 
We assume that the agent maximizes his monetary payoff. For most parts of this 
chapter we do not need to make any assumption on the agent's risk attitude. However, when 
we go to theorem 1.2 in section four of this chapter, we will assume that the agent is risk-
neutral since this lends us much convenience. 
Before choosing the action, the principal can consult an informer, who can costlessly 
observe a signal of the state of nature. 
Definition A signal of 0 is another partition of S, denoted by Q, with co its typical 
element, i.e. Q = {coj}. 
Note that Q. can be equal to or not equal to 0 . 
We say that the vector (Q, V(a)) fully describes an informer. 
Definition An informer is a vector 
We assume that the informer maximizes his monetary income. Similar to the case of 
the agent, we do not need to make any assumption on the informer's risk attitude in most parts 
This definition i l ^ y very different from the conventional one. However’ the two 
are in fact compatible. See the examples below. 
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of this chapter. But it will lend us much convenience by assuming that the informer is risk-
neutral when we go to theorem 1.2 in section four of this chapter. 
Difference in verifiability structures enables different informers observing the same 
value of the same signal to have different choices of reports. 
Definition A report, denoted by is feasible if |.i g Q. Clearly Q is then also the set 
of feasible reports. 
This definition is saying that the informers are supposed to report what they can 
observe, rather than other things else. 
It is assumed that V(Q) is common knowledge,^ in particular V(Q) is known to the 
decision maker. Hence, not all feasible reports will be accepted by the decision maker. If 
some particular values of a signal are known to be verifiable provided they have realized, then 
a report that one of these values has realized will not be accepted by the decision maker if the 
report is not accompanied by the expected verification. This idea is captured by the following 
definition. 
Definition Given co and V(Q), a feasible report, i^, is inadmissible if there exists 
V G V(Q) such that co V and g V. 
If such an V exists, then the decision maker can ask the informer for verification that 
CO J has not occurred, which is impossible to exist given co . Hence, is inadmissible. 
Definition Given co and V(n) , a feasible report, is admissible if it is not 
inadmissible. 
Denote by M(cOj) the set of all admissible reports when has realized. Note that: 
(1) M(co ) 1-LgVg V(Q), then co^  e v ] . In other words, when co has realized 
LA is admissible if there is no verification that can distinguish and co . ( 2 ) co gM(co for 
all cOj g Q . 
Example In figure 1’ given CO3 is the observed value, co, is not an admissible report 
because {cd J is in V(Q) but O3 ^{co J . However, co, is an admissible report because the 
only element of V(Q) that contain co, is H, but Q also contains ©3-
9 Here "common knowledge" is used in a non-technical way, namely, eveiyone knows 
V(Q) , everyone knows that everyone knows V(Q)’ and so on, adinjiivtnm. 
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Example In figure 1, M(O) 3) = {CO \> co 3 ,co 4}' 
A payment scheme offered by the principal to the informer consists of an agreement 
over what payment be paid to the informer conditional on the report submitted. Let QC 0) j) 
denote the payment scheme. A natural restriction on the set of possible Q is that Q ~ 0 for all 
co j En. 
We assume that the agent knows what the informer has observed and may try to bribe 
the informer to make a false report to the principal 'vVhich is more favorable to the agent. 
_ _ _ ___ !~eJ?~!~i2_~rSJ~~~ble~_~~~_~_!?e_s~~_~~_~ i __ , _ :~. e~y~~n~ ~_~~e~~ __ ~~_~_~_~h~_~~_~ __ m~_c_h~~~~ _____ _ 
to maximize. his expected monetary payoff net of payment paid to the infoi-l-ner, taking into 
account the possible collusion between the informer and the agent. 
Definition A choice l11echanis111, y (~L), is a function mapping from the set of feasible 
reports to the action set. 
We say that the vector (A, P, n, V, R) fully describes an principal-informer-agent 
problem. 
Definition - An principal-in!orJl1er-agent problenl is the vector (A, P, Q, V, R) In 
which the principal is to solve the problem: 
max L n(co ) L n(8; \co)[ p( y(co j),8;) - Q(co) 1 
QO;y(·) Cl) - e . 
J I 
subject to: 
(IIC's) Q (co j) ~ Q C ~L) + ~ j~l> V ~L E M (co j)' V co j En, 
L'. j~ = max{ meax{ R( Y ()l),8J - R( y( co ),8;)}, DJ. 
I 
where 
Here ~ - is the maximum bribery the agent is willing to pay the informer in order to 
, JJ.l ...... 
induce the informer to _report ~L when actually the in.former has observed co j' Constraints 
(IIC's) hence represents the informer's incentive compatibility constraints. 
The following examples illustrate that the class of principal-informer-agent problems 
consists of many decision making problems Widely studied in the economic literature. 
Example It is clear that the principal-informer-agent problem is a direct generalization 
of Tirole's (1986) principal-supervisor-agent problem. A principal-supervisor-agent problem 
is a principal-informer-agent problem with the principal's action set equals to the set of 
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possible contracts between the principal and the agent, constrained by that the contracts 
satisfy the agent's individual rationality constraint and incentive compatibility constraints. 
Moreover, the supervisor in the principal-supervisor-agent problem is an informer with the 
following specific signal and verifiability structure: 
- I i = {cOo ’ 2’…’ n}’ 
~ 1 i f i = i 
• * J 
• . ‘.-
71(9.1(^  ^)^^0 if i ^ j J ^ O , 
> 0 if j = 0 
V ;{(1):2 \ la}^ 
where QXcOq = {co,,co2,...,co J . The intuitive interpretation of cOq is that when the informer 
observes cOq, he observes nothing and can prove or disprove nothing. That is, cDq represents 
"no information." 
Example When V = 2", we have M(cOj) {coj for all cOj gQ. When © has 
realized, the informer can only report co In other words, the informer cannot cheat. Then, 
(lie's) are trivially satisfied. The principal-informer-agent problem becomes analytically 
equivalent to a decision making problem under uncertainty with the help of the signal Q. 
What the decision maker needs to do to motivate the informer to truly report the observed 
signal is to pay the informer a minimal amount above the latter's reservation wage. 
Example The general principal-agent problem with hidden information is a special 
case of the principal-informer-agent problem in which the informer has the verifiability 
structure, V {(j),Q}, and the action set is the set of possible contracts between the principal 
and the agent, constrained by that the contracts satisfy the agent's individual rationality 
constraint and incentive compatibility constraints. Note that in this case = Q for all 
CO. g Q , which means that the informer can report anything he likes no matter what he actually 
has observed and he cannot verify any value of signal he claims to have observed. The 
informer is worthless. Therefore, we neglect this informer in the principal-agent literature. 
The formal structure of principal-informer-agent problems provides the framework for 
us to compare the v-informativeness of informers. Yet we have to first define formally what 
do we exactly mean by v-informativeness. 
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Let p ( Q , V; A,P,R) denote the maximized payoff to the principal in the principal-
informer-agent problem (A,P,Q,V,R) . We can now define the v-informativeness of an 
informer. 
Definition (Q,, Vj) is at least as v-informative as {Q^ ‘ % ) if for all A, P and R, 
It can be easily seen that "at least as v-informative as" is a partial ordering. That is, 
(Qj, V,) and (Q^, V^) may not be comparable according to the relation. 
Definition (Q,,Vi) is more v-wformative than (0.2^2) if is at least as 
informative as ( Q ^ V while ( Q ^ , i s not at least as informative as (Qj, V,). 
Section four: On v-informativeness of informers 
Our task in this section is to derive some preliminary insights in comparing the v-
informativeness of the informers. Proposition 1.1 merely re-states the fact that the Blackwell 
theorem is applicable only when the verifiability structures concerned belong to a very special 
type - one that equals to the power set of the signal. In one of the examples above, we have 
already argued that an informer with such a verifiability structure cannot cheat. Hence the 
Blackwell theorem can applied. 
Proposition 1.1 I f V , a n d V: 2 then is at least as v-informative as 
(Q^ V2) if and only if Q, is more Q-informative than Cl^ . 
Proof Directly from the Blackwell theorem. Q.E.D. i 
Theorem 1.1 below is the first of two important theorems to be presented in this 
chapter. Theorem 1.1 will deal with informers observing the same signal, while the 
assumption that the signals are the same will be relaxed in theorem 1.2. 
Theorem 1.1 I f Q , Q,, then is at least as v-informative as (a^V^) if and 
only ifV, 
23 
Proof (/ /part) V, 3 V, implies that for all co^  gQ, - Q , , M , ( c o c M ^ C c o S o 
for all A, P and R, (IIC.s) in (A,P,Qj , V,,R) is a subset of that in and 
therefore V, ;A,P ,R) > V2;A,P,R). 
{ofily , /part) Suppose V, ^ V2. That is, there exists V such that V e % but V V” 
We first prove that there then exists co j, 1.1 gQj = Q2 such that co V [i e V and 
Suppose we cannot find such co ^ and j.L. That is for all co V and g V, there exist 
an element in V” denoted by X(cOj,|.i), such that co ^X(cOj,|a) and [i g X ( c o F o r all 
CO j V , define the subset Y(cOj) by Y(cOj): |JX(co^,},i). Note that Y(cOj) is a superset of 
hgv 
V, because for all |.I g V , there exists X(cOj,i,I) such that GX(cOj,}I)c Y(cOj). Note also 
that Y(cOj) does not contain coi, because for all g V, X(cOj,j.i) does not contain c o D e f i n e 
another subset Z by Z:= P|Y(co . Note that Z is also a superset of V because for all 
0) j€V 
CO J V Y(cOj) is a superset of V. Note also that for all co V, co Z because there exists a 
Y(cOj) which does not contain co[ Since Z is a superset of V, and does not contain any 
CO J V we conclude that Z V. Since for all CO V and gV, X(co” … i s an element of 
Vj, and since V! is closed under intersections and unions, we have Z V e V i . This 
contradicts our assumption that V V” So we conclude that there exists co |1 eQ! 
such that cOj V’ |.i g V and pi gM,((Oj). 
Note that co V, i^ieV and ^iGM^ico^) jointly imply that and 
If we can find some 
(A,P R,) such that p(Di V"A,P R , ) < p p 2 , V 2 ; A ’ P ’ R , ) ’ then 
is not at least as v-informative as (Q^^V^). We are now to find such (A,P R,). 
Consider first a special class of problems, (A,P ,Q,2" ,R) , where Q = Q , = Q , and 
V = such that the problem has unique solution. Let (Q*,y*) be that unique solution to 
this problem. Since the informer can verify all values he observes, the principal should not 
worry that he may take bribery from the agent and then mis-report the signal. Moreover, the 
principal can choose the choice mechanism as if the agent is not affected. So (Q*,Y*) must be 
10 When an informer can verify more, he has smaller room to cheat. 
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characterized by Q* = 0 and y * independent of R. We assume that y * is also characterized 
by y *(coJ *(co J for all k t .n That is the principal will choose different action when 
the informer reports different reports. 
In particular, (Q*,y*) must also solve the problem (A,P ,Q,2" ,R ' ) where: 
[l if a = y *(cOj.) for somecOj. g V 
R'(a ,e , ) = , for all 0, g 0 . 
[0 if otherwise 
We now prove that (Q*,y*) also solves the problem (A,P ,Q V2 R'). Since the set 
of (lie 's) constraints in problem (A,P ,Q,2" ,R ' ) is a subset of that in problem 
(A,P ,Q,V2,R ' ) , it suffices to prove that when the principal applies (Q*,Y*) in problem 
(A,P,Q,V2,R ' ) , all (IIC's) constraints are automatically satisfied. Consider first the (IIC's) 
constraints wi th®, g V . Since for all RJ gM^Cco J , R'(y * (RI) ,0 , ) < 1 - R'(y *(co J , 0 . ) for all 
0. € 0 (because R'(y *(ri),e,) is either 0 or 1), so we have and 
Q * ( a ) k ) 2 Q * ( ” + Ak” is therefore fulfilled. Then consider the (IIC's) constraints with 
cOk V. Since M.C® J n V = there does not exist r i e M ( a ) J such that 
R'(Y*(ri),EI) 0 R , ( Y * ( C 0 I J , E , ) . Again, we have AK” 0, and Q * ( ® J > Q * ( t i ) +A,^ 
for all Tj gM((D J is therefore fulfilled. 
Therefore we have p ( Q , V,; A,P,R') A’P’R.)• 
WE then prove that (Q*,y*) does not solves the problem (A,P,Q,V, ,R') . It suffices 
to prove that (Q*,y*) violates the (IIC's) constraints with © . S i n c e co V we have 
R'(y*(cOj),e.) = 0. However, e V and therefore R,(y *“I)’e,) = 1. So we have A^ ^ = 1, 
and Q * (CO J) 0 < 1 = Q * (lA) + Aj“. Therefore at least one (IIC's) constraint is violated. 
Since (Q*,y*) is the unique solution to (A,P ,Q,2" ,R ' ) , therefore we have 
P ( Q , V ^ ; A , P , R ' ) < P ( A 2 " ; A , P , R ' ) . Combining with the result that 
p ( a , V 2 ; A , P , R ' ) p ( a , 2 " ; A , P , R ' ) derived previously, we therefore have 
p ( Q , V , ; A , P , R ' ) < p ( a , V , ; A , P , R ' ) . Q.E.D. 
n ^ ^ T h i s assumption can in fact be easily satisfied by constmction. Suppose in the 
originally constructed problem, we have some k and 1 such that * K ) * K ) . Then we 
can always construct another problem by adding one more element, a , to the original action 
set such that P(a,0.) = *(co.),e.) for all . 0 . By reassigning * K ) = a, we can 
therefore have y *(co,) ^ Y *(o3 J in the newly constructed problem. 
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Theorem 1.1 suggests that if two informers can observe the same signal, then the one 
that can verify all those reports that another informer can verify has a (weakly) higher value to 
all decision makers. 
A direct corollary following theorem 1.1 is: 
Corollary 1.1 If Q, = then (Q,, V,) is more v-informative than (Q2, V2) if and 
only if Vj =) V2. 
Proof By definition, (Q,, V,) is more v-informative than ( f l : V2) is equivalent to that 
(Qi,V,) is at least as v-informative as (Q V and (Q,, V2) is not at least as v-informative 
as (Qj,Vi) , which is true if and only if • V, and V, ^ Vj, which in turn is equivalent to 
that Vj 3V2 . Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1.1 and theorem 1.1 jointly have the following corollary. 
Corollary 1.2 I fVi=2Q' ’ then (Q,, V,) is at least as v-informative as {0.2^^2) if 
is more Q-informative than Q^. 
Proof Directly from proposition 1.1 and theorem 1.1. Q.E.D. 
Theorem 1.1 can be viewed as a complement to the Blackwell theorem. While the 
Blackwell theorem restricts our attention to a specific type of verifiability structure, theorem 
1.1 restricts our attention to another special case - one in which both informers observe the 
same signal. Both restrictions are strong enough to make the theorems inapplicable to most of 
the economic settings. Therefore we will deal with a much more realistic case below, in which 
both of the above restrictions are to large extent relaxed. j 
In most economic settings, almost all the informers available to the decision maker 
have more or less the same "type" of verifiability structures. In fact, there may only be a 
handful different "types^' of verifiability structures in real life economic problems. Tirole in his 
seminal paper (Tirole, 1986) describes but one of the relatively common "types:" A "type" 
that the informer can either observe the true state of nature and prove that he does have 
observe it or observe "nothing" and hence cannot prove or disprove anything. Similarly, for 
any quality checkers, it is much easier to verify that there is at least one defect in a certain 
design than to verify that the design is perfect, though different quality checker may have very 
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different chances to detect any defect of the design, that is they observe very different signals 
of the quality of the design. 
We have a conjecture that if the available informers are all of the same "type," the 
more Q-informative is the signal observed by an informer, the more v-informative is the 
informer. If this conjecture is true, the applicability of the Blackwell theorem will be extended 
to a very large extent. 
However, we encounter much difficulty in proving this conjecture. The first obstacle 
is in formalizing the concept of the "type" of a verifiability structure. When we say that two 
quality checkers, say John and May, are of the same "type," we have implicitly linked up the 
value "there are defects" in John's signal to the value "there are defects" in May's signal, and 
the value "perfect" in John's signal to the value "perfect" in May's signal. While this link seems 
natural in the example of quality checkers, it may seem too arbitrary when we are examining 
any two signals in abstract forms. In any way, the names of different values of a signal are 
assigned arbitrarily and therefore should not play any role in any economically meaningful 
comparison of informers. Therefore a prerequisite of formalizing the concept of the "type" of 
a verifiability structure is to understand the way people link up values of different signals. 
It seems immediate that in at least one case this linking-up process can be understood 
more easily - the case in which the two signals concerned are numerically equivalent. It is 
because when two signals are numerically equivalent, we can then view the "link" concerned 
simply as an one-to-one mapping between the signals. The n—xt question is which one-to-one 
mapping can capture the essence of the "link" concerned. 
Again, this one-to-one mapping can be most easily found in a further restricted case -
the case in which the signals are proxies of the state of nature. It means that for any signal H, 
and for any state of nature 0, e 0 , there is a corresponding co^  g Q such that people will be 
more confident to believe that the true state of nature is 0 when co has realized than when 
any other values o f Q have realized. 12 Formally we have: 
n In the example of quality checker, it will mean that people are more willing to believe 
that the true state of a co odity is "perfect" when the quality checker observes perfect 
than when he observes "there are defects." 
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Definition D. is a proxy of 0 if: 
(1) D. is numerically equivalent to 0 ; and 
(2) there exists a one-to-one mapping, / , from Q to 0 , such that Vco ^ GQ, 
Example 0 is a proxy of 0 . 
If two signals are both proxies of 0 , there then exists an apparent way to link up the 
values of them. We first re-order the values of each signal (remember that the names given to 
each value are arbitrarily assigned, so any re-ordering should be allowed) according to the 
order of the states of nature. We called the re-ordered signal a well-ordered proxy of 0 . 
Definition Q is a well-ordered proxy of 0 if: 
(1) Q is numerically equivalent to 0 ; and 
(2) ViGl, 7i(e,lco.)>Tc(0,|cOj..). 
It means the i-th value should best predict the occurrence of the i-th state of nature. 
After we re-ordered the values of each signal, the natural way to link up the values of different 
signals is to link the i-th value of a signal to the i-th value to another signal. 
Having the "link" formalized, the formalization of the concept of the "type" of 
verifiability structure is immediate. 
Definition and (^^ ’ are of the same type if: 
(1) and Q. are well-ordered proxies of 0 ; and 
(2) there exist a one-to-one mapping, g, froip V, to V ’ such that V V G V „ 
g ( V ) = |J /7(o)j) , where /? is a one-to-one mapping from Q, to Q2 such that 
(OjeV 
h(the j - th element of ) the j - th element o f Q ^ - . 
« 
We can then formally present our conjecture as below. 
Conjecture and (Q” V j are of the same type, then (O^V,) is at least as 
v-informative as (Q^^V,) if Q is more Q-informative than ^V 
Certainly we do not think we have formalized this conjecture satisfactorily. Remember 
that our formalization of the "link” between values of different signals as well as the "type" of 
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a verifiability structure has excluded many interesting cases. We hope that further researches 
can fill the gap in this subject matter. 
Moreover, even in this restricted case, we can only prove this conjecture in the ,special 
case that \0\= 2, where \0\ is the cardinal number of 0, and both the informer and the agent 
are risk-neutral. Again we hope the future researches can fill the blank space left untreated by 
this thesis. 
The prove is presented in the following theorem. 
Theorem 1.2 If \0\ = 2, (0\, VI) and (°2, V2) are of the same type, and the informers 
as well as the agent are risk-neutral, then (01' VJ is at least as v-informative as (°2, V2) if 
°1 is more O-informative than °2. 
Proof By the Blackwell theorem, 0\ is more O-informative than 02 if and only if 
there exists a Markov matrix, M, such that L(02) = L(O\)M. Denote the typical elements of 
°1, 02 and M by 0) j' cO j and m ij respectively. 
Since both 0\ and 02 are well-ordered proxies of 0, we have: 
n:(8\lcO \) > n:(8\lcO 2) 
n:(8\)n:(cO\18\) n:(8\)n:(c0 2 181) 
==>,.. " >" " 
n:(8\ )n:( 0) 1181) + n:(82 )n:( CD 1182) n:(8 1 )1( CD 2181) + n:(82 )n:( CD 2182) 
n:(81 )n:(cO 1181) n:(81 )(l-n:(cO 1181 ») 
==> ,,> ( " ) n:(8 2 )n:(0) I 18 2 ) , n:(82) I-n:(CD I 182) 
==> n:(cO I 181) > n:(cO I 182) 
==> n:(0)1181)m ll +n:(0)2181)m21 > n:(CD I 18 2 )mll in:(0)2182)m21 
==> mll > m21 · 
Similarly, n:(82IcO I) < n:(8 2IcO 2) ==> ml2 < m22 · 
~ Let (O;y) be the solution to the problem -(A:'P, °2, V2, R). Let (Q, Y) be a mixed 
strategy such that Q(O) j) = LmjkQ(cD k) and Y(CD j) = (r(cOl),mjl;Y(c02),mj2). It suffices for 
k 
us to show that the decision maker in the problem (A, P, °1, VI' R) can achieve an expected 
payoff of at least P(02' V2;A,P,R) by applying (Q,y). 
We first show that (Q, y) satisfies all the (lIC's) constraints in (A, P, °1, VI' R). For 
all 0) j E 0 1, for all 0) ~ EM \ (0) j)' 




(m - m J) + ( - )• (cS J 
(nij m^)( ( S j ) - (S . 
Since (Qj, V j and (Q^, V j are of the same type, eM^Oi j ) . Therefore we have: 
Q ( C 0 j ) - Q K ) M m f m )max{max{R(K(5j ,e , ) -R(9((Sj ) ’e , )} o}. 
Since m - m„. > 0, we have: 
J j K) 
Q(co 0 - Q(co 2 max{niax{(mf - R(K(S j),ei)]}’o} 
Oj L J 
“ k J 
= niax{max{R(Y( ) , e , ) - R ( (cOj),ei)} o} — 
= A . 
Therefore all the (IIC's) constraints in (A,P,Q,, V,,R) are satisfied. 
We then show that by applying (Q,y), the decision maker can achieve an expected 
payoff exactly equals to ^ ( Q , , V.; A,P,R). The decision maker's expected payoff of applying 
(Q Y)is: 
^ (C0j);^7l(e,|G)j)[P(Y(C0j) eJ-Q(C0j) 
Qi 
= ! > ( 1 > ) 2 > 4 p ( k)’ ) - k): 
coj 6i k 
> ( ! > ( jie>4p( (<),ei)- k): 
ei k J 
I>(ei)I>(‘iei)[P( k) ei)-0(c5k) 
9 k 
Since it is true for all A P and R, we conclude that {Q.,, V is at least as v-informative 
as (Sl^y^)- Q-E.D. 
« 
Section five: Conclusion 
In this chapter we have taken the first step in comparing the "informativeness" of 
signals provided by some informers. Our work is important because we have explicitly deal 
with the possibility that the informers may cheat, which has long been ignored in the existing 
literature of decision making under uncertainty. We have introduced the idea of verifiability 
structure and the formal structure of the family of principal-informer-agent problems. These 
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can be used as a corner-stone for future researches on the same subject matter. Moreover, we 
have drawn some preliminary insights in the comparison of the v-informativeness of informers. 
In particular, we prove that when two informers can observe the same signal, then one who 
can verify more is more v-informative than the other. We also prove that, in a restricted case, 
when informers are of the same "type," the Blackwell theorem is applicable in comparing the 
v-informativeness of informers. 
Much work remains to be done. The concept of the "type" of a verifiability structure 
is still far from satisfactorily formalized. Moreover, the conjecture that "the Blackwell 
theorem is applicable in comparing the v-informativeness of informers whenever the informers 
are of the same 'type'" still waits for more thorough examination. Our work in this part is at 
most preliminary. 
A real life economic setting that can apply the result of theorem 1.2 will be presented 
in chapter two, which deals with the Chinese central government's problem of signing 
responsibility contracts with its state enterprises. 
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CHAPTER TWO: IDIOSYNCRATIC OR UNIFORM CONTRACTS FOR THE 
CHINESE STATE ENTERPRISES 
Section one: Introduction 
In its reforming era, China gradually abandons its bureaucratic planning system over 
the state enterprises, and replaces it by various forms of contracting out systems. The 
common feature of these various forms of contracting out systems is to allow for greater 
autonomy for the enterprise managers. Under the reform, enterprise managers are supposed 
to be able to make their own decisions in areas like human resource management, production, 
marketing, investment..., etc. Though the autonomy is still far from perfect, and management 
is still subject to political interventions frequently, enterprise managers in general have much 
fewer obligations to fulfill. All remaining obligations like the amount of profit and tax to be 
submitted to the government are included in the responsibility contracts between the 
government and the enterprises. The decentralization of authority down to the hands of 
enterprise managers is recognized by most economists to be socially desirable, and further 
reform in this direction is frequently urged. However, it is impossible for the central 
government to conclude all the responsibility contracts with its subordinatory state 
enterprises. It has to assign some subordinatory governmental units to do the job for it. 
One of the most usual ways is to simply assign the supervisory units of the enterprises to do 
so. In this case, the choice of supervisory units coincides wijth the choice of supervisors. 
Yet sometimes the central government may find it more desirable for some major terms to be 
determined uniformly by higher governmental units, say industrial ministries, and to leave only 
minimal discretion for the supervisory units. In this case the choice of supervisors is separable 
from the choice of supervisory units. 
13 There are as many as 104,400 in 1990 (State Statistical Bureau 1991, p. 15). 
14 The term "supervisor" used here differs from "supervisory unit" in the literature of 
Chinese economy. We use "supervisor" to denote the governmental unit which plays a 
dominant role in determining the terms of an enterprise's responsibility contrac^ while 
"suDervisorv unit" denotes the governmental unit to which the enterprise in question affilia es. 
15 The term "supervisor" is used after Tirole's (1986) principal-supervisor-agent problem, 
in which a supervisor is one who inform the principal about a signal of the type of the agent. 
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The choice of suitable supervisors to represent the government to determine the terms 
of responsibility contracts of the enterprises seems to be one of the major unresolved problems 
of the Chinese government. While the governmental units high in the hierarchy clearly have 
much less local information about the specific environments of the enterprises under their 
control, governmental units down in the hierarchy may more easily collude with the 
enterprises they are bargaining and concluding responsibility contracts with. The difficulty of 
the choice is manifested by the unstable policy on this matter in the whole reform era. Table 1 
tabulates the major changes in this regard. 
Table 1 
1978 enterprise fund {cpye jijiu) system 
1980 profit retention {lirmi liucheng) system 
1981 profit contract (Jinm haogan) system 
1983 tax-for-profit (// gai shui) 
1987 management contract {chengbao jingyifig zereti) system 
Under the enterprise fund system, enterprises were able to retain a part of the profit if 
they managed to fulfilled some obligatory targets. The size of the retained fund was a function 
of the set of targets the enterprise managed to fulfill. Since the function was uniform over 
different enterprises, little discretion power was left to the enterprises' supervisory units. The 
system thus approximated the extreme case where no local information had ever been called 
upon when the terms of contracts were determined. i 
The enterprise fund system was soon displaced by the profit retention system. The 
new system, while rationalizing of the old profit retention function, retained one of the major 
« 
shortcomings of the old system: Local information was still not utilized. The result was 
foreseeable: Large variation in retained profits across different enterprises arose. In 
particular, enterprises which could more readily access planned material supplies or were 
producing products with high planned prices were enjoying unjustifiably high retained profits. 
Local information was proved to be especially important at the beginning of the reform when 
the profitability was still largely out of the control of the enterprise managers. The original 
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profit retention system was soon modified into one where different contracts were designed 
for different industries. More local information was therefore utilized in the modified system. 
The profit contract system represented a further development in the utilization of local 
information. 16 Idiosyncratic profit contract was concluded with every enterprise by its 
supervisory unit. But the employment of the more informed supervisors unnecessarily implied 
that the state could therefore extract more revenue from those more plannedly profitable 
enterprises. Du and Zhang (1992), among others, observe that "profit targets were generally 
set at inappropriately low levels [in the profit contracts]" (p.153). Chai (1991) also reports 
that under the system, "enterprises were successively provided with an increased share in 
profit" at the expense of state revenues, which in turn forced the state "to cut back on its own 
investment in such strategic sectors as transportation and energy" (p.51). 
Partially due to the desire to cope with this problem, the Chinese government put 
forward the tax-for-profit system in 1983. Under the new system, a to large extent uniform 
tax system was applied to all enterprises. In fact, one of the rationales behind the substitution 
of tax for profit as the major form in which the enterprises submitted their profit to the state 
was that as the tax rates were fixed by law, it was hoped that less discretion power would be 
left for the enterprises' supervisory units. The large variation of profitability which eventually 
brought down the early version of the profit retention system was supposed to be coped with 
by the imposition of the adjustment tax. According to the tax law, the adjustment tax rate was 
a well defined and uniformly applicable function of the enterprise's 1983 profit level (Dong 
1988). 
Clearly the original plan of the state was to level the retained profits without calling for 
the help of local informers. However, in practice the adjustment tax rates were never so 
determined, but were jointly set by the enterprises' supewisory units and the corresponding tax 
departments instead. The deformation of the original design of the adjustment tax could be 
The profit contract s^tem differed from the profit retention system also in the way the 
state shared profits with the enterprises. Under the profit contract sy^em, enterprises were 
u ^ ^ s e d to bear all the risk of running the business, though p r a c t ^ y the persistence of soft 
budget constraint rescued most enterprises from bearing the risk of making loss. 
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attributed partially to the weakness of the state capacity, and partially to the sub-optimality of 
the original design. 
The management contract system which has been implemented since 1987 represents 
the nominal return (while the real return had already happened after the deformation of the 
original design of the adjustment tax) of the idiosyncratic incentive system similar to the profit 
contract system. This nominal retreat from the ideal tax-for-profit system has been criticized 
by many economists who believe that a standard tax system is the correct direction of reform 
in the long mn.i? Wong (1987), among others, argues that the existing system "is particularly 
subject to abuse at the lower levels, where local officials see this as an opportunity to 'rob' the 
state treasury by reducing total tax payments" (p.397). 
It seems that if governmental units down in the hierarchy have more local information 
about the enterprises, choosing a governmental unit that has more local information about the 
enterprises is not always desirable, or to speak in technical terms, choosing an informer who 
can observe a more f2-informalive signal is not always desirable in practice. 
However, with the exception of chapter one in this thesis, there has been no attempt so 
far in the economic literature to explain the underlying reason of the above phenonemon. 
Worse still, the extremely idiosyncratic nature of the management contract system is still 
applauded at least by radical reformists, notwithstanding the abundant counter-evidences. In 
any way, it is reasonably natural for one to conjecture that a decision maker can never be 
worse off with an informer who can observe a more Q-informative signal, for the decision 
.maker can always duplicate what he will do when he faces an informer who can observe a less 
Q-informative signal (see theorem 1.2 in chapter one and proposition 2.9 in section eight of 
« 
this chapter). 
To the best of my knowledge, this chapter is the first attempt to explain formally the 
mechanism underlying the phenomenon described above. Section two will set up the model of 
picking the appropriate supervisor for the state enterprises. In section three to seven, we will 
analysis the optimal contracts between the central government and the mid-tier governmental 
17 See, for example, Wu and Liu (1991). 
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unit and the enterprise under different situations. The last section will compare the values of 
different mid-tier governmental units to the central government. 
Section two: The model 
There are three parties in the model: The central government, the mid-tier 
governmental unit and the state enterprise. We assume that all of them are risk neutral, so that 
we do not need to share our attention with the problem of risk sharing. 
The enterprise produces a good whose value to the central government is normalized 
to 1. Denote the enterprise's output by y, and its cost of producing y units of the good by 
(y where 0 is a productivity parameter of the enterprise. The cost increases with y and 
decreases with 0 : > 0, < To guarantee that the second order conditions in the 
subsequent discussion automatically fulfilled, we make four more technical assumptions: 
yy > 0’ yyy > 0, < 0 Bod ^ < 0 . Thc fiFSt two assuiTiptions say that the cost function 
is not only convex in y, but the convexity is increasing in y as well. The third and the fourth 
assumptions say that productive enterprise has a lower marginal cost as well as a smaller 
convexity in the cost function at every level of output. 
For simplicity, we assume there are only two types of enterprises: The productive 
ones and the unproductive ones. It means that the productivity parameter 0 has only two 
possible values, namely 9 (productive) and 9 (unproductive). Correspondingly, we present 
(y,§) as (y) and as (y). The prior probability of any enterprise to be 
productive is v’ and therefore that of unproductive is l-v. 
Though the enterprises know their productivity well, the central government has 
« 
absolutely no idea about it. However, the central government knows that the mid-tier 
governmental unit can observe a signal Q of the enterprises' productivity 0 , and it can make 
use of this valuable local information by assigning the authority of concluding contracts down 
to the hand of the mid-tier governmental unit. Since analytically it is equivalent to concluding 
18 vj/ and e are the first derivatives of the cos t funct ion wi th respect to y and 0 
respectively. T h / s e c o n d and third derivatives will be similarly denoted in the subsequent 
discussion. 
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contracts by the central government itself under the advice of the mid-tier governmental unit, 
so it is suffice for us to model the process with a principal-supervisor-agent model. Moreover, 
according to our discussion in chapter one, the model can also be viewed as an informer game. 
We assume that the signal observed by the mid-tier governmental unit has only two 
values: Q = {coi , co }. It means that there can only be four types of verifiability structures: 
type I: {(KQ}, 
type II {(t),{coJ,Q}, 
type III: {([^ {co }’ ’ and 
type IV: {(t),{c0i},{0) J 
A type I informer can verify none of the values he observes. A type II informer can verify an 
CD,-report i f he has o b s e r v e d co,. Similarly, a type III informer can ver i fy an co 2-report if he 
has observed co . A type IV informer can verify any claim he makes to the central 
government. 
The relationship between 0 and O can be flilly described by two parameter. The first 
one is the prior probabilities of observing cOi, denoted by n. The second is the conditional 
probability of an enterprise to be productive if is observed, denoted by m. Therefore for 
any given signal, the posterior probabilities can be expressed in terms of v, n and m only: 
Prob(G) I = 
— A v - n m 
Prob ( 0 e CO2) " 
1 - n 
Prob ( 0 = 9 i = l-m, ’ 
1 - V - n ( l - m) 
Prob ( 0 = 6 Ct CD2) 
1 — n 
As the assignment of the names co^  and co, to,the two values of the signal is merely 
arbitrary, so without loss of generality we can always assume that m v. That is, we always 
assume that co, isa favorable signal of 9 , and co, is a favorable signal ofG. 
Our next step is to capture the idea that the lower is the rank of the mid-tier 
govmimental unit in question, the more Q-informative is the signal observed by it. Suppose 
there is two mid-tier governmental units, with one higher in the hierarchy than another. 
Denote the signal observed by the high rank unit by Q (n , m) and that of the low rank unit by 
37 
n (n' , m'). Then the idea that Q (n' nV) is more Q-informative than Q (n , m) requires that 
there exist a Markov matrix M such that 
(1) L(Q (n m)) L ( n (n, m')) M, 
where L(Q (n , m)) and L(Q (n', m')) are the likelihood matrices of Q (n , m) and Q (n', m') 
respectively: 
v - n m nm 
L(Q(n ,m))= 1 n V m ) n ( l - m ) 
_ 1 —V 1 - V . 
v-n'm' n'm' 
. ' m,)) l - v - n ' ( l - m ' ) n - ( l - m ' ) . 
. 1 -V 1-V _ 
Let the Markov matrix that satisfies (1) be 
c 1 - c 
M 
_d l - d _ 
Therefore the right hand side of (1) becomes 
• c v - ( c - d ) n ' m ' ( l - c ) ( v - n ' m ' ) + ( l - d ) n ' m ' 
V V 
c ( i _ v ) - ( c - d ) n ' ( l - m ' ) ( l - c ) ( l - v - n ' ( l - m ' ) ) + ( l - d ) n ' ( l - m ' ) . 
_ r ^ 1-v -
For (1) to hold, we must therefore have 
(2) c v - c - d ) n m v - n m , and 
(3) c ( l - v - n , ( l - m i ) ) + dn , ( l -m,) = l - v - n ( l - m ) . 
Solving the simultaneous equations (2) and (3), we have | 
1 n(m' -m) , 
c = l " " ^ and 
^ , m - V 
n(m ' -m) . , , , (^ 5 iVm,d n 'mi-nm + (""^~ ) ( v - n m ) . 
V•^  m ' - v . 
The definition of Markov matrix requires that c’ d g [0 1]. For c to be less than one, 
we must have the second term on the right hand side of (4) to be positive and smaller than 
unity. As we always assume that m'> v, we must have m, > m. Given m, > m’ the assumption 
that m V in turn ensures that c > 0. On the other hand by transforming (5), we can see that 
d < 1 is also automatically guaranteed whenever m, > m. Further calculation will yield the 
, n ( m - V ) 
result that d > 0 if and only if n • . 
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As a summary, Q (n' , nV) is more Q-informative than O (n , m) if and only if nV m 
, n ( m - v ) 
and n > . Since 
c ( m ' - v ) 
m - V m - V 
c (m ' -v ) m ' - v - n(m'-m) 
m - V 1 
< 1 ’ 
( m - v ) + ( m ' - m ) ( l - n ) 
rm, i^ m^ 
it suffices for us to assume that > in order to capture the idea that lower rank 
V" ' J I " 
governmental unit can observe a more Q-informative signal than higher rank governmental 
unit. 
The timing of this principal-supervisor-agent game is as follows: 
Period 1: The enterprise observes its type (productive or unproductive). The mid-tier 
governmental units observe their signals ( or co ). 
Period 2: The central government chooses one of the available mid-tier governmental 
units as its informer. 
Period 3 : The central government signs (responsibility) contracts with its informer and 
the enterprise respectively. The enterprise signs bribery contract with the mid-tier 
governmental unit. 
Period 4: The mid-tier governmental unit report what it has observed to the central 
government. The enterprise produces certain amount of output. The central government 
rewards the mid-tier gove ental unit and the e n t e r p r i s e according to the (responsibly) 
contracts. The enterprise pays the bribe to the mid-tier golernmental unit according to the 
bribery contract. Denote the reward given by the central government to the mid-tier 
governmental unit by Q, that to the enterprise by R, ..and the bribe given by the enterprise to 
the mid-tier governmental unit by B. 
We assume that whenever the enterprise gives one dollar to the mid-tier governmental 
unit the latter will only receive k . [0 , 1] dollar. The reciprocal o f k can be viewed as an 
index of the likelihood that the bribery is to be detected. Since there is always risk incurred m 
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the bribery process, one dollar paid out of the enterprise's pocket will be perceived as less than 
one dollar in the eye of the mid-tier governmental unit.i9 
As the last step of specifying the model, we have to specify the objective functions of 
the parties involved. We first normalize the enterprise's and the mid-tier governmental unit's 
reservation returns to zero. We then assume that the enterprise's objective is to maximize R-
-B; the mid-tier governmental unit's objective is to maximize Q+B. The central 
government's objective function is a weighted summation of its own return, the mid-tier 
governmental unit's return, and the enterprise's return: 
W y - R - Q + R — - B ) + A/ (Q + B). Here and X^  are the weight of the enterprise's 
return and the mid-tier governmental unit's return in the central government's objective 
function respectively. If they both equal to one, then the central government is benevolent. If 
they both equal to zero, then the central government only cares about its own revenue. In 
general we assume that they both lie at somewhere between zero and one. 
Section three: Complete information case 
As a benchmark, we first investigate how will the central government conclude 
responsibility contract with an enterprise if the central government has complete information 
of the enterprise's productivity. For expositional purpose, we confine our attention to the 
class of linear incentive schemes only (as we will do in the rest of this chapter), that is, we only 
consider incentive schemes of the form R a + by. Under Complete information, there is no 
need for any help from the mid-tier governmental unit, and the optimal contract in this case 
has already been worked out by Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole (1985). The central 
^ -
government's problem is: 
(6) max W y-XExj/(y)_(i-X^E)(a + by)’ 
subject to the enterprise incentive compatibility constraint: 
( J ) y G arg max 
and the enterprise individual rationality constraint: 
^ For an i n t e r p r e t a t i ^ f k>l, see Tirole (1992). 
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(8) a + b y - 4 ^ ( y ) > 0 . 
Rewrite (7) as b = ,(y),2o and incorporate it as well as (8) into (6). The central 
government's problem becomes: 
(6') max W = y (b ) -^ (y (b ) ) , 
b 
where y(.) denotes the choice of y made by the enterprise when the slope of the contract is b. 
The first order condition of(6') i s b = 1. The second order condition is automatically satisfied 
given the technical assumptions specified at the beginning of section two.^i Denote y(l) by 
——y*. Therefore we have: — 
Proposition 2.1 Under complete information, the optimal incentive scheme for 
whatever type of enterprise is R *) - y* + y. 
Note that unity is also the value of the product produced by the enterprise, so an 
incentive scheme with slope equals to unity also maximizes the social welfare. 
Section four: Incomplete information with type I informer 
From this section on we will investigate into the cases of incomplete information. We 
will first consider the case of incomplete information with type I informer in this section. 
Recall that a type I informer has the following verifiability structure: { f ^ } . That is, a type I 
informer cannot verify any claim he makes. As we have argued in chapter one, a decision 
maker can never do better with a type I informer than with no informer at all. So this case is 
i 
also equivalent to that of no informer. ‘ 
Appealing to the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979), the central gove ent cannot 
do better than applying the optimal direct mechanism. So it suffices to consider the class of 
direct mechanisms only. Suppose the central government offers the enterprise two kinds of 
ei, 30 any - t is by its 1 
r ^ T h e second order condition of (6, is y" (b ) - )(y’(b))2 : )y"(b) = By 
, . 1 m is positive so the second term is negative. From (7) and the 
the technical assumptions ^ ^ - terms can be 
first order condition, we know that T ^ - b - l , so me 
cancelled out. Therefore the second order condition is satisfied. 
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incentive schemes, contingent on the type the enterprise reports it belongs to. The incentive 
scheme offered to the reportedly productive enterprise is R = a + by, and that for the 
reportedly unproductive one is R a + b . The central government's problem becomes: 
(9) —max W = + 
a ,b ,y .a ,b ,y L 
+ (1 — v)[y - ( y ) + by)], 
L— 
subject to four incentive compatibility constraints: 
(10) ( ; ) “ ’ 
(11) — 
(12) . a + by - ^ ( y ) > a + b y - ^ ( y ( b ) ) , 
(13) a + b y - > a + by(b) - 4l(y(b)) ’ 
and two individual rationality constraints: 
(14) a + b y - ^ ( y ) > 0 , 
(15) a + b y - 2 ^ ( y ) > 0 , 
where y(.) and y(.) are the choices of output levels made by the productive and unproductive 
enterprises respectively. (10) and (11) are simply the analogies of (7) for the productive and 
unproductive firms respectively. (12) and (13) guarantee that productive enterprises will not 
pretend to be unproductive, and u roductive ones will not pretend to be productive. (14) 
and (15) corresponds to (8) for the productive and unproductive enterprises. 
As is standard in the literature, given (15), the individual rationality constraint (14) is 
never binding.- Since it will never be optimal for both (14) and (15) to be unbinding,- we 
conclude that (15) must be binding. As (14) is never binding, we see no reason why a should 
not be suppressed to as low a level as possible until (12) becomes binding. At last’ 12) 
reduces constraint (13) to: 
The productive enterprise can always duplicate what the 
22 The logic IS • P s ^^^ same amount of reward as the unproductive 
unproductive one production cost. So it can always guarantee 
enterprise does in this case it wm hat the unproductive enterprise does. 
itself a reward larger than zero by do^g l^ j j^ ^xist a positive amount such that the 
23 If both (14) J^hout affecting inequalities in 
central government - n ^ower a and ^ q u a l ^ y [an improve its welfare, while 
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(13') 
which is actually unbinding. As we will see very soon, even if we deliberately ignore (13') 
when we solve the problem, the solution will automatically satisfy (13'). 
This reduces our total number of constraints down to only four. Put aside the two 
unbinding constraints (13) and (14), and incorporate the others into (9). The central 
government's problem can be transformed to: 
(9') max W = vfy(b) -}^ ^ ( y ( b ) ) 
b,b L — 
- ( 1 - )( ( ) ) - h y { b ) + by(b) - ^ G m 
+ 0 - v ) [ y ( y - 2 1 ( y ( b ) ) " . 
Solving the problem yields the following two first order conditions: 
(16) y ' (b) = by ' (b) , and 
v ( l - ^ ' ) ( y ( b ) - y ( b ) ) 
(17) 1 -
Condition (16) implies that “ 1 . The right hand side of (17) is positive, implying that 
b < l . T h e second order conditions are guaranteed by the technical assumptions 
introduced in section two. The result is standard in the literature: The unproductive 
enterprise is to produce at below first best level so that the central gove ent can save some 
money in motivating the productive one to produce at the first best level (Arrow, 1986). 
Proposition 2.2 Under incomplete information with type I informer the optimal 
contract is R = V ( y ) - b y . b y for unproductive enterprise and 
24 Proof Adding (12) to (1—3), w^h^ve: _ . 
•(^(y(b)) - by(b)) (^ (y(b) ) by(b))J 
- [ ( ( ) ) - by(b)) - (^ (y(b) ) - b y ® ) ] ^ 
f f ^ ( v F ( y ( b ) ) - b y ( b ) ) d b d 0 < O 
Je Jb 
^ f f l ^ h y, (b) - y(b>- by, (b))dbd0 < 0 
Je Jb de ^ y 
^ j ^ p f _ A y ( b ) \ i b d 0 < O 
Je Jb dG y 
j f r ^ b d 0 < O 
Je Jb 
= > b > b . Q.E.D. 
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R = - b y + b y ( y - j + *) - y * + y for product ive one , w h e r e y * is def ined in 
section two, and b, y(.) and y(.) in equations (10), (11) and (17). The informer will not be 
called into service and thus only receives his reservation wage. 
Before we end this section, we would like to derive the following lemma which will be 
useful in the subsequent sections. 
Lemma 2.1 b decreases with v. 
Proof From the first order condition (17), we have: 
db - 0 - b ) y ' ( b ) - ( l - ^ ^ ) ( y ( b ) - y ( b ) ) 
'• •- 4 f 7 .-.. — … … - - — 
dv ^"W 
By our technical assumptions, W is strictly concave in b,^^ so the denominator on the 
right side is negative. The derivative is therefore negative. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.1 says that the higher is the probability that an enterprise is unproductive, the 
closer is the slope of the incentive scheme offered to the unproductive enterprise to its first 
best level, as the cost of deviating from the first best level is also higher now. 
Hereafter we will denote b by whenever we want to stress that b is a function of 
the probability of an enterprise to be productive. 
Lemma 2.2 Holding the productive enterprise incentive compatibility constraint and 
the unproductive enterprise individual rationality constraint binding, R - (y) increases with 
b . 
Proof A [ r - ^ ( y ) ] . A f a + b y ( y - ^ y ( b ) ) ] i 
ABL L 
= A f ^ ( y ( b ) ) - by(b) + by(b) — ^(y(b) ) ] • ( y - y ( y 
5B •• 
-J xu \ 
^ f d 0 > O . Q.E.D. ‘ 
JE VI/ 
‘ V yy y 
25 Proof - + ( -Z'(fe)) 
db -1 
“ ) n V) ( I z b ) ' y ^ ( y ( b ) ) _ i 
< 0 Q . E . D . 
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Lemma 2.2 shows that the productive enterprise will be better off if the slope of the 
incentive scheme offered to the unproductive enterprise is closer to its first best level. Since 
we have already shown that this will be the case if the probability that an enterprise is 
productive is smaller in lemma 2.1, we can therefore conclude that the smaller the probability 
that an enterprise is productive, the better is the productive enterprise. 
Section five: Incomplete information with type II informer 
"The~eentral~governmen^^cmtinues—to~be~igflorant about-the enterprise's productivity^ 
But this time it is lucky enough to have a type II informer. Recall that a type II informer has 
the following verifiability structure: {(t),{co,},Q}. This type of informers can verify an cOj-
report but not an co^-report. With the help of the informer, the central government can offer 
up to four different incentive schemes to the enterprise contingent to the reported type of the 
enterprise and the report made by the informer: 
Ri ai +biy for productive enterprise when informer reports ’ 
R, a, +biy for unproductive enterprise when informer reports cOj, 
R2 a2 + hiy for productive enterprise when informer reports co and 
2 +b .y for unproductive enterprise when informer reports co -
The central government's problem is: 
(18) _max W nm[y(b,) - ^ ( y ( b i ) ) — (1 - A")Ri-(1 — ')Q(co,) 
bi.b2,bi.b2 1 
+ n ( l - m ) [ y ( b , ) - 2 T ( y ( b , ) ) - ( ! - ) Q ( c o , ) : 
+ (V — nm)[y(b2) - * ^ ( y ( b 2 ) ) - (1 - )R2 - (1 - )Q(co^): 
+ ( l ^ v - n ( l - m ) ) [ y ( b , ) - )) 
where the maximand is the expected payoff of the central government. 
In order to guarantee that, no matter what the informer reports, both types of 
enterprise will not pretend to be the other types, we have the following enterprise incentive 
compatibility constraints on the incentive schemes: 
(19) a . + b , y(b,) - ^ (y (b i ) ) > a , + b, y ( b , ) - (y )) 
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(20) a2+b2 y(b2 ) - ^ ( y ( b 2 ) ) > a , 4 - b, yCb^) )), 
(21) a, + b , y ( b , ) - ! F ( y ( b , ) ) > a , + b , y ( b , ) - ^ ( y ( b , ) ) , and 
(22) a, + h,y(b,) — ) ) > a 2 + b2y(b2) - )). 
(19) and (20) are simply the and co2-report versions of (12), while (21) and (22) are those 
of(13). 
Similarly, we have four enterprise individual rationality constraints: 
(23) a i + b , y ( b , ) - T ( y ( b 0 ) > 0 , 
(2^ L + b 2 y ( b 2 ) - ^ ( y ( b 2 ) ) > 0 , 
(25) a , + b , y ( b 0 - S ( y ( b 0 ) > 0 , a n d 
(26) a , + b , y ( b 3 ) - 2 l ( y ( b , ) ) > 0 . 
(23) and (24) are the and o^report versions of (14), while (25) and (26) are those of (15). 
As before, (25) and (26) make (23) and (24) unbinding. Moreover, (19) and (20) also reduce 
(21) and (22) to: 
(21') b, <b i , and 
(22 b , < b 2 , 
respectively. However, whether (25) and (26) are necessarily binding is not yet clear at this 
place. 
The reason why we cannot tell immediately whether (25) and (26) are binding is that 
the situation is more complicated than our previous situation with type I informer. Now we 
know that our (type II) informer can verify co! but not co]. So if the informer reports co the 
central government will hesitate to believe it. In particular if the enterprise's payoff is higher 
when the informer reports co^  rather than an. informer observing co^  will have every 
incentive to take bribery from the enterprise and then submit a false report of co to the central 
government. In order to motivate an informer observing to report truly, the central 
government has to reward report ofco,.^^ The minimum reward is the maximum bribery an 
An informer observing co, will always reports truely, as he cannot verify a report of 
COi. 
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informer observing cOj can receive if it reports co . Thus we have the following informer 
incentive compatibility constraints?? 
(27) Q(co 1) - Q(co 2) 2 k. maxjj 2 - ^(y(b2))] - [Ri - ^ (y (b , ) ) ] 
R2 - M y ( b 2 ) ) ] - [ R i ))] } and 
(28) Q ( c o J > 0 . 
The third term in the brace corresponds to the reward to report of ©2, which equals to the 
» -
reservation wage of the informer (zero by our assumption). It is clear that both constraints 
must be binding. 
Since R2, R : and Q(co,,) are all (weakly) increasing in a there is no reason why a: is 
not suppressed to as low a level as possible until (26) is binding. The fact that (26) is binding 
implies that the second term in the brace of (27) can never be positive. So (27) can be 
rewritten as: 
(27') Q(co 1) k. max{[R2 — ^(y(b2))] - [Ri _ ^ ( y ( b . ))] ol . 
L J L J 
Similarly, both R^ and Q(co,) are (weakly) increasing in a . As reducing a: can 
always enhance the welfare of the central government constraint (20) must also be binding. 
However, though R2 and R2 are (weakly) increasing in a„ Q(co,) is (weakly) 
decreasing in it. So suppressing a, as low a level as possible may not always be desirable. 
The same is also true for ai. Therefore it is still not clear by now whether (19) and (25) are 
binding or not. Nevertheless, it is not that difficult to figure out the condition under which the , “ 
central government will choose to reduce Ri and R, rather than Q(co,). 
• Suppose the initial contract is characterized by an unbinding constraint (25). What will 
happen if the central government reduces both L and a, by e? If 8 is small enough all the 
originally unbinding constraints can remain unbinding.28 Therefore the benefit of doing so is 
that with probability n (the probability of reporting co^, the central gove ent will pay s less 
^ ( 2 7 ) and (28) implies that we are ej^ 
the set o f c o l l u s i o n - p r o o f contracts only. In this simple setting the decision maker (the ceutral 
g o v e r n ^ n l i cannot do better than offering the optimal collusion-proof contract. See Tirole 
The changes on the left and nght sides of constraints (19) and (21) will automatically 
cancel each other. 
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to the enterprise. The cost of doing so depends on whether the first term in the brace of (27') 
(hereafter denoted by A) is non-negative. If it is, the cost is that with the same probability, the 
central government has to pay ks more to the mid-tier governmental unit. If it is not, there 
will be no cost incurred at all. So the net gain from reducing ai and a^  is at least 
n s , which is independent of the original levels of ai and a^ The central 
government will choose to reduce ai and a, if: 
(29) (1 i)k. … 
If (29) does not hold, we immediately have the following results: 
Lemma 2.3 Q(co,) = 0 if (29) does not hold. 
Proof Suppose not, then A must be positive. The central government can gain from 
decreasing Q(co,) by ks and increasing both ai and a, by 8. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.4 A = 0 if (29) does not hold. 
Proof Suppose not, by lemma 2.3, A < 0 . (25) must then be binding, or else the 
central government can always improve its own welfare by decreasing both ai and a, by s. 
Similarly, (19) must be binding, or else the central government can always do better by 
decreasing ai by e. Binding constraints (19) and (25) reduce (21) to: 
(21,) b , < b , -
Solving (18) subject to Q(co Q O ’ • and binding constraints (19), (20), (25) 
(26),29 we have the optimal contract characterized = b, =b(m) , 
b bf v - and a,, a2, a, and a. given by (19), (20) (25) and (26) respectively. By 
-2 - 1 - n J , _ 
lemma 2.1, we have b , > b , , and by lemma 2.2, A 0, which is contradictory to our initial 
assumption. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.4 implies that: 
(30) a i + b , y ( b , ) - ) ) = a2 + h y (b2) - (y ( -)). 
Lemma 2.5 (19) must be binding if (29) does not hold. 
as will be shown by the characterizations of the optimal 
contract. 
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Proof Suppose not, the central government can then gain by moving b, towards unity, 
\ 
and adjusting a so that Rj can be held intact, until either (19) becomes binding 
(the proof is then finished) or bj = 1. By equation (30) and binding constraints (20) and (26) 
the fact that (19) is unbinding necessarily implies that b: b”3o We therefore have b: > 1 
which cannot be o p t i m a l . S o if (29) does not hold, (19) must be binding. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.6 (25) must be binding if (19) does not hold. 
Proof Suppose not, then (21) rfiust be binding, or else the central government can gain 
by lowering a, by 8. The fact that both (19) and (21) are binding implies that ai a, and 
bi = bj. The central government is not going to offer separate incentive schemes for different 1 
I 
types of enterprise when the informer reports coi. Solving the problem of (18) subject to 
ai = a i , bi (30), and the binding constraints (20) and ( 2 6 ) , w e have three first order 
conditions: 
( — — 
X ^ = 0=>nm(y ' (b i ) -b ,y ' (b i ) ) 
5b 1 _ 
+ n(l m) [y ' (b , ) -b ,y ' (b , ) + ( l - ^')(y(bi) — y(b^))] 0 
- ( l - m ) ( l - ^ ' ) ( y ( b , ) - y ( b , ) ) 
i::>bl — 1= 7=-= —"""" > 0 
m y ' ( b , ) - y ' ( b , ) +y ' (b , ) 
=> bi > 1, 
f = 0 => (V — n m ) ( / ( b 2 ) — b (b )) 0 
ab2 
=>[2 = 1, and 
2 _ 
—(V + n(l — m))(l E) (y(b2)- yCb^)) 0 
V + n(l - m))(l - )(y(b3) — y(b,)) • 
2 : ( l - v - n ( l - m ) ) y ' ( b , ) 
<1. 
^ b = b o n l y i n ^ i ^ ^ t i n g case where (19) and (25) are both binding. 
31 The reason why b. should not be larger than unity, that is should not be larger than the 
first best level can be ea'sily seen from the fact that increasing b, and thus y(b,) will not only 
increase the production cost (which is the only cost incurred in ; n f o r _ o n 
case) but also increase the payment to the productive enterprise (via (20) and (30)). 
32 Constraint (21') is not binding, as can be seen soon. 
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Combining the first and the third first order conditions, we have i^ i fe! > 2. 
However, the fact that (25) is not binding implies that b < b .Contradiction arises. 
Q.E.D. 
We now have ground to work out the optimal contract under the circumstance that 
(19) does not hold. By lemma 2.5 and 2.6 (19) and (25) are binding, so we have b, =^2. 
Solving (18) subject to b, ^ b (30) and binding constraints (20) 25) and ( 2 6 ) ? we have 
the following three first order conditions:-
/^ W /— — — — — \ 
= 0 => nm(y ' (bi)-biy ' (bi) ) 0 
1, 
i^ W ‘ /— — — — — \ 
5b 2 
=> U2 1, and 
^ = 0 zz> (1 - v)(y'(b,) - b, y'(b,)) - (1 - )v(y(b,) — y(b,)) = 0 
_ 
1 —b, = > 0 
- ( l - v ) y ' ( b , ) 
=>bi <1. 
Note that the optimal contract does not distinguish the incentive schemes under 
and co2-reports. This means that the informer has not been called into service under the 
optimal contract. Therefore we have: 
^ (2i') and (22,) are not binding at the optimal solution, as will become clear very soon. 
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Proposition 2.3 Under incomplete information with type II informer, if the 
combination of m and k falls into area A in figure 5, the optimal contract will be characterized 
by Q(co 1) Q O 2) = 0, L : 1 ’ fei V), and L’ ^ a, and 2 being given by (19) 
(20) 25) and (26). 
Let's come back to the case where (29) holds. If we assume that (29) holds, the 
immediate result is that (25) must be binding (or else the central government should keep on 
reducing both L and a,). It can then be shown by contradiction that A must be non-negative. 
Lemma 2.7 A is non-negative whenever (29) holds. 
Proof Suppose not, then there would be no need to reward reporting and reducing 
a, by 8 small enough can only benefit the central government. An immediate result is that 
(19) must be binding. 
Under such circumstance, the central government can always enhance its welfare by 
doing the following: 
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First, if b j > 1, reduce b: to unity, increase - a: and decrease]; ai such that (20) and 
(26) remain binding. By doing so, the central government can pay less (ai is decreased) to the 
productive enterprise, while making the unproductive enterprise produce at the first best level 
(y(l) = y *) at the same time. After the change, the payoff of the productive enterprise when 
the report is Oj is still lower than that when the report is ©I, so Q(CD,) is still equal to zero, 
and the incentive schemes corresponding to report of CO2 are not affected. 
— , ^ ‘ 
Second, if b2 1, replace b2 by unity, adjust ai such that (20) remains binding. Since 
2 ^ 1, (22') still ho lds , and the incentive scheme for the u n p r o d u c t i v e enterprise under coj-
report is unaffected. As long as (26) holds, the payoff of the productive enterprise under CDj-
report depends only on the incentive scheme for the unproductive one under the same report; 
as the latter does not change, the former will not change. This in turn guarantees that A 
remains unchanged and Q(o),) remains zero. As a result, by doing so, the central government 
can gain from making the productive enterprise under co2-report produce at the first best level 
(y(l) = y *) without the need to pay a penny more. 
Third, if b, > 1, reduce b, to unity, increase a, and decrease a such that (19) and (25) 
remain binding. As ai decreases, A will increase. So it may happen that before b, reaches 
unity, A has already risen to zero. If it is really the case, then just stop there - we have 
arrived at a place where A is non-negative and the central government is better off than it is 
initially, and the proof is finished. If it is not the case, we can move on to the next step. 
Fourth, if bi 1, replace bi by unity, adjust ai such that (19) remair^brirding. With 
similar reason to that in the second step, the central government can gain from making the 
productive enterprise under coi-report produce at the first best level without the need to pay a 
penny more. 
Now we have both b, and b2 equal to unity. There can be two mutually exclusive 
cases: Either b, < b^ or b, > b , . The former case implies that a, <a2, which in turn implies 
da 
34 Holding (26) binding, (&2) < . 
35 Holding (20) and (26) binding, ^ = —^(fe:) + y(fe) > • 
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that A is non-negative -- a contradiction. Our remaining task is to prove that the latter case 
can never be optimal. 
Recall that the posterior probability of the enterprise to be productive when the 
informer reports co! is m, and that when the report is cOj is - — , which is smaller than m 
1 - n 
whenever m > v. By lemma 2.1, we have b(m) < b - — . If b! > b:, either b, > b(m) or 
V 1 - n 
b j < b or both. Then the central government can always gain by moving bj towards 
- ~V 1 - n ) / .. -
b(m) and b: towards b ’ until b, Again we reach a place where A is non-
V 
negative and the central government is better off than it is initially. Q.E.D. 
We now examine under what condition will (19) be binding. 
Lemma 2.8 (19) will be binding if: 
(31) m(\-X^)>{\-X')k. 
Proof Suppose not, then lowering ai alone by 8 small enough to hold all (binding or 
unbinding) constraints intact will reduce the expected payment to the enterprise by nme and 
increase37 the expected payment to the mid-tier governmental unit by nks. The net gain of the 
central government from doing so is n | m ( l - e) — ( l -?J )k]e which is independent of the 
initial level of ai. The central government will do so if and only if (31) holds. This means that 
the initial contract is not yet optimal. Q.E.D. 
Lemma 2.9 A 0 if the combination of m and k falls in area B. 
Proof Suppose not, then the central government can gain by raising ai by 8 and 
lowering Q(co i) by ke. Q.E.D. 
A = 0 implies (30). So by logic similar to lemma 2.5 and 2.6, we can concluded that: 
36 During the process b, remains larger than b., a, remains larger than a2, and Q(co,) 
remains zero The effects on the central government's welfare of the changes in the slopes of 
the incentive schemes offered to the u roductive enterprise under different informer reports 
can therefore be viewed separately. As in section three, the central government s welfare is 
concave in both b, and so moving them towards their individual second best levels 
enhances the central government's welfare. 
37 It is because (31) implies (29), which in turn implies that A>0 . 
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Proposition 2.4 Under incomplete information with type II informer, if the 
combination of m and k falls in area B in figure 5, the informer will not be called into service. 
Proof Similar to those of lemmas 2.5 and 2.6. Q.E.D. 
Now if (31) holds, the combination of m and k will fall in areas C or D in figure 5, and 
constraint (19) will be binding. Assume that A 0, the central government's problem is then 
to maximize (18) subject to binding constraints (19) (20), (25) 26), Q(co,) = A and ( 2 8 ) ? 
Substituting the constraints into the objective function, we can get the following four first 
order conditions: 
• ^ 0 => nmfy ' (b , ) - ) ) ? ( b . ) 
5b 1 i 
_(1 - XE ) ( ^ ' ( y ( b , ) ) ? ( b i ) ) (1 - ) k . 0] 0 
(32) =>bi 
ab2 L — — J 
+ ( V — n m ) [ y ' ( b 2 ) - ^ ^ b 2 y ' ( b 2 ) - ( l - \ ) ( b 2 y ' ( b 2 ) j 
+ [ l - V - n ( l - m ) ] - 0 0 
(33) 
M = 0 _ (1 - E ) - y , ( b , ) - b , ) 
1 L - — 
+ n ( l - m ) [ y ' ( b , y ' ( b , ) - ( 1 - “ y ' ( b , ) 
- ( 1 - 1 ) ) ] 
Z=> ( y ( b , ) — y(b, ))[nm(l )k _ nm(l _ ) + (i _ ) k ( n - nm) 
+ n ( l - m ) [ y ' ( b , ) - b , y ' ( b j ] - 0 
(34) => 1 - fei : - “ “ ^ T ^ ^ ^ i z t r " ^ > , and 
a b , L -
^ c h e c k l a t e r " ^ t c o n s t r a i n t s ( 2 1 , ) a n d ( 2 2 , ) a r e b o t h u n b i n d i n g . 
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+ (V - nm)[—(1 — E )(-_y(b,) + y(b , ) ) : 
.— — 
=> (y(b2) lib,)) n ( l n m ) 
+ ( l - v - n ( l - m ) ) ( l - b 2 ) y ' ( b 2 ) = 0 
n(J - ) k + (V - nm)(l - E)](•( ) y(b2)) ^ 
(35) = l ( l - v - n ( l - n . ) ) y ' ( b . ) “ > 0 . 
The-first thing we should note is that (21') and (22,) are automatically fulfilled. The 
i ( l - v ) k ( l — + 
second is that A is positive if and only if m > . 
1 — 
Lemma 2.10 If (31) holds, A is positive if and only if: 
(36) m > ^ . 
Proof A is positive if and only i f b , < b , . Rewrite (34) and (35) as: 
( y ( b 0 - y ( b 0 ) , 
(34,) 1 - fe i oci ^ ’ and 
(y (b , ) -y (b3 ) ) 
(35,) 1 - 2 c^ , 
. 1 ^ mri-— - k f l - I) n( l -Xi)k + (v-nm)(l-X^E) 
respectively, where a , — and a : - i _ v - n ( l - m ) . 
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A 
/ ( y ( b ) - y ( b ) ) 
• ' I > b 
b 
Fig. 6 
( y ( b ) - y ( y ) 
From figure 6 above, it is clear a larger a will shift up the a ^^  ^ schedule 
and entail in a smaller equilibrium b. Therefore b, < b, if and only if a , oc: • So it is suffice 
for us to prove that a , > a . if and only if (36) holds: 
m(i — E ) - k ( i - > J ) n ( l - i)k + ( v - n i n ) ( l - E) 
1 - m 1 - v - n ( l - m ) 
0 ( 1 - v - n ( l - m ) ) m ( l - X ' ) > ( l - m ) ( v - n m ) ( l - X ^ ) 
c > m ( l - X E ) - ( l —v)k(l — i) v ( l - E) 
<=>(m —v)(l — E) l - v ) k ( l — I) 
( l - v ) k ( l _ > J ) + v ( l - E) 
om> • 
Note that X ) … ] E ) f^ct a weighted average of ) and 
1 ( l - v ) k ( l - > J ) + v(l — ^ ) 
unity. If (29) holds, as we have assumed, we will have 1 _ . 
So (36) is a subset of (31). Since (32) - (35) are derived with the assumption that A>0’ 
lemma 2.6 means that this assumption is not self-defeating only in the range where (36) holds. 
Therefore we have: 
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Proposition 2.5 Under incomplete information with type II informer, if the 
combination of m and k falls in area D in figure 5, the optimal contract is characterized by 
bi =b2 = 1, bi and b: being given by (34) and (35) respectively, ai, a2, a, and a: being given 
by (19) 20) (25) and (26) respectively, Q(co,) = kA and QCcoJ = 0. 
Actually what happens when m > ( 1 - ) ? ^ ^ can obtain some 
1 
ideas about it by doing some simple comparative statics. It is easy to see that a , is decreasing 
» 
while is increasing in k which implies that b, is increasing and 2 is decreasing in k. 
When k equals zero, that is when the informer cannot receive any bribery at all, 
v - n m .Ex 
E - 7 - 1 ( 1 ) 
iTHi- J and a . • The resulting b, and 2 are therefore b(m) and 
1 1 - m I - _ 
1 - n 
bf ectively where m and are the posterior probability of an enterprise to 
1 - n , 1 - n 
be productive when the informer report is co, and co^  respectively. It means that if the 
informer cannot take bribery, the central government can do its best by simply applying the 
optimal direct mechanism given the posterior probability of an enterprise to be productive 
conditional upon the informer report. 
When k increases from zero, b, increases and b, decreases. The central government 
finds it desirable to narrow the gap between b, and b. so that it does not need to pay so much 
to motivate the informer to report truly. As the ability of the informer to take bribery increase, 
the central government has to narrow the gap more. 
According to lemma 2.7, A must be non-negative. Combining with lemma 2.9, we 
therefore have the following lemma: 
Lemma 2.11 In the case that j _ - < m < , t t is 
when the combination of m and k falls in area C in figure 5, we have A 0. 
Since A 0 implies (30), we conclude that: 
Proposition 2.6 Under incomplete information with type II informer, if the 
combination o f m and k falls in area C in figure 5’ the informer will not be called into service. 
Proof Similar to those of lemmas 2.5 and 2.6. Q.E.D. 
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The gap between b, and eventually vanishes when k reaches the point such that 
( 1 - v ) k ( l - X i ) = ( m - v ) ( l - E). a , and a^ converge to Z ( 1 _ A 1 while b, and 
1 — V 
converge to b(v) . Now the incentive schemes offered to the productive and unproductive 
enterprises become the same under the two different reports. In other words, the central 
government will do exactly what it will do with a type I informer or without informer at all. 
As a summary of propositions 2.3 - 2.6, an informer will be called into service only if 
m > (1 v)k(l — + E) That'is, only when the signal observed by the informer is Q-
informative enough. When the informer is too Q-uninformative, the central government will 
find the benefit brought by the) signal too small to cover the cost incurred in motivating the 
informer to tell the truth, and the informer will therefore not be called into service. 
Section six: Incomplete information with type III informer 
A type III informer is one whose verifiability structure is {(t),!©^,^}, and therefore 
can verify co: but not co,. So it will be bribed to mis-report co^  when it actually observes Oj, 
but not vice versa. In order to motivate the informer to report truly, the central government 
has to reward reporting co^ . The minimum reward is the maximum bribery an informer 
observing co^  can receive if it reports . T h u s we have the following modified informer 
incentive compatibility constraints: — — 
(27") Q(c0,)-Q(c0i)>k-max{[Ri - ^ ( y ( b , ) ) ] — [ r _^(y(b2))] , 
K, - ))] — [r.. - ) ) ] ’ o } and 
(28') Q((O,)>0. 
The central government's problem is therefore to maximize (18) subject to constraints 
(19) - (26), (27") and (28'). The main features of the optimal contract is summarized by the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 2.7 Under incomplete information with type III informer, the optimal 
1 — — ui ^ r i m 
contract is characterized by Q(co J = Q(co,) = 0, b =b2 = l, fe, Mm) fe: " ^ J 
and a . a . , a, and a., being given by (19), (20), (25) and (26) respectively. 
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Section seven: Incomplete information with type IV informer 
As argued in chapter one, a type IV informer, whose verifiability structure is 
{ ^ { < ^ i } ’ { ® 2 } ’ Q } cannot cheat the central government. So after paying the reservation 
wage to the informer, the central government can take over all the information the informer 
has. The problem of the central government is therefore to maximize (18) subject to (19)-
(26). The optimal contract is given by the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.8 Under incohiplete information with type IV informer, the optimal 
/^v-nm^ 
contract is characterized by Q(co Q O ! ) 0, b i=b2 = l, i = b ( m ) = 0 — ’ 
V 1 n J 
and ai, a i , a, and a, being giv^n by (19), (20), (25) and (26) respectively. 
Section eight: Comparative values of mid-tier governmental units to the central 
government 
The following results are immediate from propositions 2.2 - 2.8. 
Proposition 2.9 For mid-tier governmental units of the same type, the lower is the 
rank of a mid-tier governmental unit in the hierarchy, the more valuable is the mid-tier 
governmental unit to the central government. 
Proof The proof for types I informers is immediate. The central government will 
consider all type I informers as non-valuable at all, and so every type I informer is at least as 
valuable than other type I informers. The same is true for type II informers when 
1 “ l _ v ) k ( l — + E) The proof for type III and IV informers is also straight 
1 - E 
forward. The central government will take over all the information hold by a type III or IV 
informer, so the value of the informer is positively linked to the Q-informativeness of the 
signal he manages to observe. As low-ranked governmental units can observe more O-
informative signals, they are therefore more valuable. So what we need to prove is that the 
( l - v ) k ( l - + 
proposition is true for type II informers when m > . 
Denote by W* the maximized expected welfare of the central government when the 
informer is of type II. It suffices to show that the first derivatives of W* with respect to m 
and n are both non-negative. Differentiating W* with respect to m, we have: 
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4k 
^ n{fy(bi) X E ^ ( ^ ( b , ( y ( b , ) - R , ) 
^m L J 1 
- y ( b 2 ) - ^(y(b2)) - (1 - ^ ) 2] + (yCb^) — b J } 
=n{( l — - a i ) - [ y ( b , ) ))] + [y{b,) - ))]} ’ 
which is non-negative. Similarly, differentiating W* with respect to n, we have: 
^ = m f y ( b i ) - E^(y(bi) ) - (1 - Ey^i - (1 - X?)Q(co 1) 
dn 
+ (1 - m ) f y ( b , ) - M y ) ) - ( 1 - B i - ( 1 - )Q(®.) 
— --
m[y(b2)— E (•( 2)) - (1 - E )R2 
- ( 1 — m)[y(b,) — X^  ) ) - ( ! - ' m 
_ — 
The first term in the last expression is positive, while the second one is negative. This makes 
5 w 
the sign of the last expression not immediately clear. To work out the sign o f - ^ , we first 
derive the second derivative of W* with respect to n: 
=((1 —X”m-(1 — -
r ( ( l - X ^ ) m - ( l - ^ ^ ) k ) ( y ( b , ) - y ( b , ) ) J a b , 
= ( 1 - _ • ( 2) 2) ~ ~ " 
— — 
_ 
The derivatives of ai and b, with respect to n vanish because b, is independent of n. The 
. . £2 . 
expression in the bracket equals to the length a c - a b in figure 7 and is thus positive. — is 
. , .hm ^ (1 v)k(l —Xi) + v(l — E) have the second derivative of W* 
positive provided m > . 
with respect to n positive. 
As the derivative of W* with respect to n is increasing in n, it becomes suffice for us to 
show that it is positive when n approaches its lower bound, that is zero. Denote l imb, by b , 
and lima2 by a . We have: 
n—0 , 1 
+ (1 - m)[y (b , ) - ) ) j - (1 . 
—c. f ’ — —0 and 
Denote the last e x p r e s s i o n by S i n c e " ^ — " ^ ! ^ dn[ ab, J ’ 
((1 E )m - (1 - I ) k ) ( - l ) ( ? (b,) - y' (b,)) 
ab -
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+ (1 - m)( - l )y ' (b,) + ( l - n i ) ( l - b , )y" ( b O < 0 , 
* r- ,1 • 
we have > ^ ( h ) = 0. Therefore we have l i m - ^ > 0’ and hence > • tor all n in 
the interval [ 0 , 1 ] . Q.E.D. 
(( ? m - (1 - b) - g b ) ) 
( 1 - m M b ) y 
\ : . / f 
r ^ b 
Fig. 7 
Proposition 2.9 is a restatement of theorem 1.2 in chapter one. It suggests a possible 
reason why people sometimes have such illusion that idiosyncratic responsibility contracts 
which utilize more local information can better enhance the centre's payoff. It also tells us 
— w h a t assumption they have implicitly made when they claim so. The following proposition 
says that when this assumption does not hold, things will be very different. 
proposition 2.10 A low-ranked governmental unit is less valuable to the central 
government than a high-ranked governmental unit if one of the following is true: 
(i) the low-ranked unit is of type I while the high-ranked unit is of type III or IV; or 
the low-ranked unit is of type I while the high-ranked unit is of type II with 
m T I ^ , 
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(iii) the low-ranked unit is of type II with ——^ ^ ^ - , while the 
1 
high-ranked unit is of type III or IV; or 
( l - v ) k ( l - ? J ) + v(l-?lE) 
(iv) the low-ranked unit is of type II with ——,^ ( while the 
high-ranked unit is of type III or IV and their ranks do not differ too much from each other. 
Proof The proofs for (i) - (iii) are immediate. To prove (iv), it is suffice to prove that 
when m > — ^ , ‘ 
(37) Wm * ( m , n ) = W^^ * (m, n ) > W„ * ( m n ) , 
where Wm*(m’n)’ and W„*(m,n) are the central government's maximized 
1 
expected payoffs when the mid-tier governmental unit is of types III, IV and II respectively. 
Since Wjj*(m,n) is continuous in m and n, (37) will imply that there exists (m n’ » ( m n) 
such that Wm * (m n) = Wiv * (m, n) Wii * (nV, n') > Wii * (m, n) ’ and (iv) will then follow. 
To prove (37), note that as the problem of the central government has less constraints 
when the mid-tier governmental unit is of type IV than when it is of type II. So we already 
have Wm*(m n) = Wiv*(m’n)2W„*(m’n) . Our task is therefore to show that the 
inequality sign is in fact a strict one. 
Denote the vector (b,,^^) when the informer is of type II by and that when 
the informer is of type III or IV by (b , ,b , ) . Note that we have already show that b > b, and 
b , < b , in section five (see pp.44-45). Denote b y j ( b , , b , ) the following expression: 
+n(l - m)[y (b,) - (b,)) - (1" 
+(V - nm)[y(b2) - )) - (1 - ‘ 
+(1 - V - n(l — m))[y(b,) — ^{yjh,)) — (1 — ^ )R, 
Clearly *(m,n) = W,, *(m,n) = and W„ *(m,n) = r ( 6 ) - n ( l - Q K ) . 
~ A A 
So it is suffice for us to show that rCbpb ) 
Note that r ( b , , b , ) is strictly concave in b, and and achieves its maximum at 
( 6 ” 6 2 ) . Therefore we have > r ( b , , 6 . ) . Q.E.D. 
39 For a proof see footnote 19. 
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Proposition 2.10 suggests how fragile is the believe that low-ranked governmental 
units can always provide more valuable information to the central government. 
Section nine: Conclusion 
In this chapter we have demonstrated how a mid-tier governmental unit observing a 
more Q-informative signal can happen to be less valuable to the central government. The key 
of such phenomenon lies on the difference in verifiability structures among different mid-tier 
governmental units. This finding sheds new light on the direction of future research on the 
centre-enterprise relationship. Field research on how mid-tier governmental units justify the 
terms of the responsibility contracts they offered to the enterprises under their jurisdiction to 
the centre must now enter our research agenda. 
One of the possible causes for the difference in verifiability structures may lie in the 
difference in the ways different mid-tier governmental units collect their information about the 
enterprises under their jurisdiction. For example, high-ranked gove ental units often collect 
their information by undertaking nationwide tuji jmncha (sudden inspections), while low-
ranked governmental units collect their information through daily interaction with the 
enterprises. Information collected during the sudden inspections, like stocks of working 
capital or vintages of physical capital, has the nice property that it can be readily verified, 
while information collected through daily interaction with the enterprises, like problem-solving 
ability of the managers or morale of the workers, is mostly non-verifiable. Therefore different 
- - m i d - t i e r governmental units not only observe different, s i g n a l s ” but—can—have very different 
verifiability structure as well.4o 
The result that low-ranked governmental units may not be informationally more 
valuable than their high-ranked counterparts helps to explain how idiosyncratic responsibility 
contracts may turn out to be harmful to the centre by making use of the more v-informative 
but less verifiable signals instead of the more verifiable though less v-informative signals. 
^ Tsui for suggesting this example. 
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Yet there remains an important gap to be filled if we want to have a complete 
explanation for the emergence of uniform responsibility contracts. Indeed what our theory 
has actually shown is that idiosyncratic responsibility contracts that involve low-ranked 
governmental units may be informationally inferior to those that involve high-ranked 
governmental units. Though it is natural to suppose that more uniform responsibility contracts 
will be concluded when less local information is employed, our theory does not tell why. 
Worse still, the contract theory does suggest that if it is known that there are n different types 
of enterprise, the optimal contract should at least contain n different incentive schemes, each 
to be offered to one type of enterprise. It means if we suppose that almost all enterprises 
differ to some extent from the others, there should be as many different incentive schemes as 
the number of enterprises in China. But it is not what we have actually observed. So there 
must be something missed in our theory. 
One of the possible ways to fill this gap is to introduce some costs to the construction 
of every additional incentive scheme, so that it is not cost-efficient to offer to many incentive 
schemes. Another way is to admit that the center does not have prior knowledge on the 
possible types of enterprise. The center only knows that a particular type of enterprise exists 
not until some mid-tier governmental units report (with verification) so to the center. When 
the center employs less local information, fewer different incentive schemes will be offered, 
and the responsibility contracts will become more uniform across different enterprises. 
— - . . . - — - - - , — - — — 
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